FCC Seeks Comments on ATSC 3.0 and Google's DRM Role in Next-Gen TV Broadcasting effectively privatizing control of public airwaves

 

This graphic helps visualize the key concepts how DRM implementation in ATSC 3.0 potentially transfers control of public airwaves to private technology companies like Google, raising important questions about accessibility, interoperability, and regulatory oversight.

By Technology Staff | April 15, 2025

A formal comment filed with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) today is raising serious questions about whether the next generation of television broadcasting is undermining public access to the airwaves by handing significant control to Google.

San Diego resident Stephen Pendergast submitted a detailed challenge to the FCC's GN Docket No. 16-142, arguing that the implementation of Digital Rights Management (DRM) encryption in ATSC 3.0 (commonly marketed as "NextGen TV") conflicts with fundamental broadcasting laws that established the airwaves as a public resource.

"The implementation of DRM encryption effectively privatizes access to what is legally defined as a public resource," Pendergast wrote in his comment. "By restricting which devices can receive broadcasts and under what conditions, broadcasters have unilaterally altered the foundational relationship established by Congress between broadcasters and the public."

The filing specifically calls out the ATSC 3.0 Security Authority's (A3SA) decision to use Google's Widevine as the exclusive DRM technology for encrypted broadcasts. This choice effectively gives Google gatekeeper status over which devices can be certified to receive encrypted ATSC 3.0 signals.

Pendergast pointed to widespread device compatibility issues as evidence of the problematic arrangement. Currently, devices using Apple's ecosystem or Microsoft's platforms cannot access DRM-protected ATSC 3.0 broadcasts, as Widevine is incompatible with competing DRM systems like Apple FairPlay and Microsoft PlayReady.

This technical decision has significant real-world implications for consumers. Early adopters who purchased ATSC 3.0 tuners before broadcasters began encrypting their signals have found these devices suddenly unable to receive certain channels. Meanwhile, consumers are increasingly limited to purchasing expensive new television sets with built-in, certified ATSC 3.0 tuners rather than using more affordable external devices.

The comment also raises questions about internet dependency, noting that DRM-protected broadcasts require internet connectivity for initial authorization and potentially for ongoing use. This requirement represents a significant departure from traditional over-the-air broadcasting, which has historically been accessible without an internet connection.

Broadcasters have defended the encryption measures as necessary security features to prevent signal theft and content piracy. However, critics like Pendergast counter that traditional ATSC 1.0 broadcasts have operated without encryption for decades without causing significant harm to the broadcasting industry.

"Television broadcasts have been unencrypted for decades without causing the collapse of the broadcasting industry," Pendergast noted. "The existing copyright enforcement mechanisms have proven sufficient to protect broadcasters' legitimate interests."

The FCC is currently reviewing the ATSC 3.0 transition as part of its broader examination of the future of broadcasting. The agency has delayed the official transition from ATSC 1.0 to ATSC 3.0 until at least June 2027, providing time for these concerns to be addressed.

Pendergast's comment proposes several remedies, including prohibiting encryption of basic service tier content, establishing open technical standards for interoperability, explicitly protecting fair use rights for recording, and requiring broadcasters to demonstrate how any proposed DRM restrictions are consistent with their public trustee obligations.

The comment is part of a growing chorus of concerns about DRM in ATSC 3.0. Technology bloggers like Lon Seidman and "Antenna Man" Tyler Kleinle have been vocal about the consumer impacts, encouraging their followers to submit comments to the FCC docket.

The FCC is accepting public comments on this issue through its Electronic Comment Filing System. Interested parties can submit their perspectives by referencing GN Docket No. 16-142 at https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filings.

Comment to the Federal Communications Commission

Re: GN Docket No. 16-142 - "Authorizing Permissive Use of the 'Next Generation' Broadcasting Television Standard"

To the Federal Communications Commission:

I am writing to express serious concerns regarding the implementation of Digital Rights Management (DRM) encryption in the ATSC 3.0 broadcast standard. After careful consideration of both the legal framework governing broadcasting in the United States and the practical impacts on consumers, I respectfully submit that DRM encryption as currently implemented fundamentally contradicts the statutory requirements and public interest obligations of broadcasters.

The Legal Framework and Its Conflict with DRM Encryption

The Public Trust Doctrine

The Communications Act of 1934 established that the electromagnetic spectrum is a resource owned by the public, not by broadcasters. Broadcasters are granted temporary licenses to use this public resource with the explicit understanding that they will serve as trustees acting in the public interest.

The implementation of DRM encryption effectively privatizes access to what is legally defined as a public resource. By restricting which devices can receive broadcasts and under what conditions, broadcasters have unilaterally altered the foundational relationship established by Congress between broadcasters and the public. This represents an unauthorized extension of broadcasters' limited rights over the airwaves.

The Public Interest Standard

The "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard has guided broadcast regulation since the Radio Act of 1927. While the Commission has interpreted this standard with some flexibility, it has consistently emphasized public access, diversity of programming, and service to local communities.

DRM encryption stands in direct opposition to these core values by:

1. Creating artificial barriers to access that did not previously exist
2. Limiting the devices through which the public can receive broadcasts
3. Restricting consumers' ability to record and time-shift content
4. Potentially impairing accessibility for people with disabilities who rely on specialized equipment

Nothing in the Communications Act or subsequent legislation authorizes broadcasters to implement such technological restrictions on public access to over-the-air broadcasts. The entire regulatory structure presumes open access to broadcast signals, with limitations coming from natural factors rather than artificial technological barriers.

The Questionable Necessity of DRM

Broadcasters have claimed that DRM encryption is necessary for security and to prevent piracy. However, these claims warrant scrutiny for several reasons:

1. Television broadcasts have been unencrypted for decades without causing the collapse of the broadcasting industry
2. Existing copyright enforcement mechanisms have proven sufficient to protect broadcasters' legitimate interests
3. No substantial evidence has been presented that piracy of over-the-air broadcasts has caused demonstrable harm warranting such restrictive measures

The timing of DRM implementation—coinciding with the transition to a new broadcast standard rather than responding to a demonstrated problem—suggests that the motivation may be to create new control points and revenue opportunities rather than addressing an existing harm.

Consumer Impact

The implementation of DRM has significant negative impacts on consumers:

1. Financial Burden: Consumers are forced to purchase new, often more expensive equipment to receive signals that were previously accessible with a wider range of devices
2. Planned Obsolescence: Existing ATSC 3.0 tuners that were purchased without DRM capability have been rendered partially or wholly obsolete by the encryption of signals
3. Restricted Fair Use: Consumers' ability to record broadcasts for personal use, a right established by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, is impaired or eliminated
4. Reduced Device Compatibility: The limited number of certified devices restricts consumer choice and raises costs

Proposed Remedies

In light of these concerns, I respectfully urge the Commission to consider the following remedies:

1. Prohibit Encryption of Basic Service Tier Content: Require that all programming that fulfills broadcasters' public interest obligations be transmitted without encryption, ensuring that the basic service tier remains freely accessible to all members of the public with standard receiving equipment
2. Establish Technical Standards for Interoperability: If some form of content protection is deemed necessary, establish open technical standards that ensure broad interoperability across devices and platforms without requiring expensive certification processes or restricting consumer rights
3. Protect Fair Use Rights: Explicitly prohibit DRM implementations that prevent recording for personal use, time-shifting, or other established fair use activities
4. Create a Consumer Equipment Transition Plan: Require broadcasters to provide a clear, extended timeline for any DRM implementation to prevent sudden obsolescence of consumer equipment
5. Require Public Interest Impact Assessments: Before approving any DRM implementation, require broadcasters to demonstrate how the proposed restrictions are consistent with their public trustee obligations and how they will mitigate negative impacts on the public

Conclusion

The implementation of DRM encryption in ATSC 3.0 represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between broadcasters and the public—a shift that has occurred without proper consideration of the legal framework governing broadcasting or the impact on consumers.

As the Commission considers the future of ATSC 3.0, I urge you to reaffirm the foundational principle that the airwaves belong to the public and that broadcasters' use of this resource must prioritize public access and service over private commercial interests.

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen L Pendergast
7132 Park Village Rd
San Diego, California 92129-4538

spender@alum.mit.edu
1(858)243-4231

 

Appendix  A – Legal Background

Legislation Governing Broadcasters' Use of Public Airwaves

The primary legislation permitting broadcasters to use public airwaves is the Communications Act of 1934, which established the fundamental framework for broadcasting regulation in the United States. This legislation has several key principles relevant to your question:

The Communications Act declared that "the airwaves were a utility owned by the public" and established a system where broadcasters are permitted to use this public resource through licenses issued by the government.

Under this framework, "station licensees, as the trustees of the public's airwaves, must use the broadcast medium to serve the public interest." This creates a fiduciary relationship where broadcasters are expected to operate in the "public interest, convenience, and necessity."

The justification for this arrangement is that the government's exclusionary licensing scheme was balanced by requiring broadcasters to act as "public fiduciaries" with a primary duty to serve the public interest.

Though radio and television broadcasting are commercial enterprises, the Communications Act recognized the airways as "public property, not to be owned," noting their "public interest necessity and convenience."

Potential Conflict with DRM Encryption in ATSC 3.0

The implementation of DRM encryption in ATSC 3.0 potentially conflicts with these public interest obligations in several ways:

Critics argue that DRM encryption "contradicts the intent of the Communications Act of 1934, which established broadcast television as a public service." The encryption of broadcast signals could undermine the principles of public access by requiring proprietary hardware, internet connections, or corporate-controlled authentication systems.

Some commenters have noted that "the electromagnetic spectrum is OURS collectively" and that "public broadcast licenses are rooted in the idea of a well-informed public is good for everyone." They view encryption as "just a move to monetize what is otherwise a public resource."

Public Knowledge Policy Counsel Kathleen Burke questioned whether "there are additional piracy concerns in ATSC 3.0 that didn't exist in ATSC 1.0," suggesting that the motivation may be less about preventing piracy and more about control over how content is accessed.

Critics like Lon Seidman have pointed out that when ATSC 3.0 signals aren't encrypted, they provide significant technical benefits like improved reception, but encryption is "significantly limiting consumer choice and adoption of the new format."

Financial Impact on Consumers

The implementation of DRM in ATSC 3.0 could have several financial impacts on consumers:

The encryption requirements involve "seemingly endless certification hoops, potentially driving up the cost of ATSC 3.0 converter boxes." This makes the technology more expensive for consumers who want to access these broadcasts.

According to Tyler Kleinle (known as "The Antenna Man"), without affordable external tuners that can handle DRM, "the only option is a $600 television set." This represents a significant cost increase compared to existing solutions.

The DRM requirements have created obstacles for existing consumer technologies. For example, Apple TVs and Xbox consoles don't support the Google Widevine DRM that ATSC 3.0 requires, and there doesn't appear to be plans to change this in the near future. Similarly, Roku devices and LG TVs don't meet A3SA requirements for undisclosed reasons.

Without DRM encryption, the market could have developed more affordable options like the $60 GT Media USB stick that can receive unencrypted ATSC 3.0 signals. However, encrypted signals require more expensive certified hardware.

There are also concerns about long-term impacts, as "broadcasters can revoke any television brand's license at any time," potentially rendering consumers' expensive equipment obsolete. Additionally, the encrypted content "cannot be recorded or used in a DVR application of the customer's choosing," limiting consumers' ability to use the content they receive.

Broadcasters' Perspective

It's worth noting that broadcasters have offered justifications for implementing DRM:

The NextGen TV team argues that security mechanisms are needed "to prevent disruptions and content theft." They compare it to how "nearly every website uses a seamless signing and authentication process to ensure consumers get what they're expecting and hackers are kept out."

Broadcasters maintain they "need to use encryption and digital rights management (DRM) on their ATSC 3.0 streams to make the service a safe place for content." However, critics suggest the real concern might be protecting "revenue from broadcast retransmission fees, which now constitute a significant portion of their earnings."

In summary, there appears to be a fundamental tension between the public interest obligations established in the Communications Act and the implementation of DRM encryption in ATSC 3.0. The financial impact on consumers includes higher costs for compatible equipment, limited device compatibility, and potential restrictions on how content can be used.

There are significant weaknesses in the broadcasters' arguments when examined against the legal framework established by the Communications Act of 1934 and subsequent legislation.

Let me analyze why their justifications for DRM encryption appear inadequate when considered against the legal requirements:

1.      Public Trust Doctrine: The fundamental premise of broadcast regulation is that the airwaves belong to the public, not to broadcasters. Broadcasters are merely granted temporary licenses to use this public resource with the understanding that they will serve the public interest. Adding encryption that limits access contradicts this core principle.

2.      False Equivalence to Websites: When broadcasters compare ATSC 3.0 encryption to website security, they're making a false equivalence. The internet wasn't established as a public utility with specific public interest obligations under federal law. Broadcast spectrum explicitly was.

3.      Piracy Prevention Claims: The argument that DRM is needed to prevent piracy seems questionable when ATSC 1.0 has operated without encryption for decades. If piracy of over-the-air content were a significant problem, it would have manifested in the current system. This suggests the motivation may be more about control and business models than legitimate security concerns.

4.      Creating Artificial Barriers: By implementing encryption that requires special hardware, internet connectivity, and certification processes, broadcasters are effectively creating barriers to access a public resource - something that appears contrary to their role as trustees of the public airwaves.

5.      Potential Monopolistic Practices: The certification requirements for hardware manufacturers create a potential for anti-competitive practices, as they limit which devices can access public broadcast signals. This could violate not just the spirit of communications law but potentially touch on antitrust concerns as well.

It's worth noting that the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard, while somewhat vague, has consistently been interpreted by courts to favor public access and diversity of viewpoints. Restricting access through technical means appears to contradict this interpretation.

I'll expand on the argument that DRM encryption in ATSC 3.0 fundamentally conflicts with the legal framework established for broadcasting in the United States.

The Public Trust Doctrine of Broadcasting

The Communications Act of 1934 established a unique legal relationship between broadcasters and the American public. Unlike most commercial enterprises, broadcasters operate under what is essentially a public trust doctrine. This doctrine rests on several key principles:

1. Public Ownership of the Airwaves

The electromagnetic spectrum is legally defined as a public resource. Broadcasters don't own the frequencies they use - they are temporarily licensed to use them. This principle is explicit in the legislation and has been affirmed repeatedly in court decisions.

When broadcasters implement encryption that restricts access to public airwaves, they're effectively asserting a level of control over the resource that exceeds their legal authority. They're treating a public resource as if it were private property, which directly contradicts the statutory framework.

2. The Fiduciary Relationship

The licensing system created a fiduciary relationship between broadcasters and the public. As the Supreme Court has affirmed in multiple cases, broadcasters are not ordinary businesses - they have special obligations precisely because they're using a scarce public resource.

By implementing DRM that limits how the public can access, record, or utilize broadcast signals, broadcasters are unilaterally altering this fiduciary relationship. They're imposing restrictions that weren't contemplated in the original regulatory framework and that shift the balance of power away from the public and toward private commercial interests.

3. Public Interest Standard

The "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard has been the cornerstone of broadcast regulation since 1927. While the standard has been interpreted with some flexibility over time, it has consistently emphasized public access, diversity of viewpoints, and service to local communities.

DRM encryption works against these core values by:

• Reducing access to broadcast content
• Limiting the devices and methods through which the public can receive broadcasts
• Creating artificial scarcity where none naturally exists
• Potentially restricting fair use rights that have long been established for broadcast content

The Legislative History and Intent

The legislative history of broadcasting regulation in America shows a consistent concern with ensuring public access to the airwaves. From the Radio Act of 1927 through the Communications Act of 1934 and subsequent amendments, Congress has repeatedly emphasized that the primary purpose of broadcasting regulation is to secure the public's interest in this shared resource.

The introduction of DRM appears to be a significant departure from this historical understanding. Congress never authorized broadcasters to restrict public access to over-the-air signals through encryption. In fact, the entire regulatory structure assumes open access to broadcast signals, with limitations coming from natural factors (signal strength, geographic reach) rather than artificial technological barriers imposed by the broadcasters themselves.

Misalignment with Other Legal Principles

DRM encryption in ATSC 3.0 also conflicts with other established legal principles:

1. Fair Use Rights

The Copyright Act and subsequent court decisions have established robust fair use rights for broadcast content, including the right to time-shift (record for later viewing) as established in the landmark Sony v. Universal Studios case. DRM systems that prevent recording or restrict playback directly interfere with these established legal rights.

2. Accessibility Requirements

The Communications Act includes specific provisions to ensure broadcast accessibility for people with disabilities. DRM systems may interfere with assistive technologies or specialized playback devices, potentially violating these accessibility requirements.

3. Consumer Protection Principles

By potentially rendering existing equipment obsolete and requiring consumers to purchase new, more expensive devices, the implementation of DRM raises consumer protection concerns. These include potential issues with deceptive practices if consumers purchase ATSC 3.0 equipment that later becomes incompatible due to changes in encryption systems.

The Questionable Necessity Argument

Broadcasters' claims that DRM is necessary for security or to prevent piracy appear particularly weak when examined against the historical record. For decades, television broadcasts have been unencrypted without causing the collapse of the broadcasting industry. The existing copyright enforcement mechanisms have proven sufficient to protect broadcasters' legitimate interests.

The sudden introduction of encryption when transitioning to ATSC 3.0 suggests that the motivation is not addressing an existing problem but rather creating new control points that can be monetized - either through hardware certification fees, data collection, or other mechanisms that weren't possible under the previous technological regime.

Remedies and Potential Approaches

In addressing these concerns with the FCC, several approaches might be effective:

1. Emphasize the statutory limits on broadcasters' authority to restrict access to public airwaves
2. Challenge the necessity of encryption by requesting evidence that piracy of over-the-air broadcasts has actually caused demonstrable harm warranting such restrictive measures
3. Highlight the consumer impact in terms of forced obsolescence of equipment and the financial burden of purchasing new compatible devices
4. Propose alternatives such as allowing encryption only for premium content beyond what was traditionally broadcast, while maintaining open access for basic channels that fulfill the public service obligations

This argument frames the issue not merely as a technical or consumer protection matter, but as a fundamental question about the legal relationship between broadcasters and the public - a relationship that was deliberately structured to prioritize public access and service over private commercial interests.

Source Citations

FCC Docket and Comment Submission Information

1.      Federal Communications Commission. "How to Comment on FCC Proceedings." Retrieved from: https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/how-comment

2.      Federal Communications Commission. "FCC Seeks Comment on State of Next Generation Television Transition." Retrieved from: https://www.fcc.gov/fcc-seeks-comment-state-next-generation-television-transition

3.      Federal Communications Commission. "FCC Seeks Comment on Deployment of Next Generation TV Technology." (Document FCC-22-47, GN Docket No. 16-142). Retrieved from: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-seeks-comment-deployment-next-generation-tv-technology

4.      Federal Communications Commission. "FCC Addresses Pending ATSC 3.0 Matters and Petitions." (GN Docket No. 16-142). Retrieved from: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-addresses-pending-atsc-30-matters-and-petitions

5.      Koherence's response to FCC Docket 16-142 and ATSC 3.0 DRM. (December 10, 2023). Retrieved from: https://in-koherence.com/koherences-response-to-fcc-docket-16-142-and-atsc-3-0-drm/

6.      Seidman, L. (July 17, 2023). "The FCC Responds to my ATSC 3 Encryption Complaint - They Want To Hear From You!" Retrieved from: https://blog.lon.tv/2023/07/10/the-fcc-responds-to-my-atsc-3-encryption-complaint-they-want-to-hear-from-you/

Communications Act and Broadcasting Legislation

7.      Communications Act of 1934. Wikipedia. Retrieved from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Act_of_1934

8.      Bureau of Justice Assistance. "The Communications Act of 1934." Retrieved from: https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1288

9.      The First Amendment Encyclopedia. "Communications Act of 1934 (1934)." Retrieved from: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1044/communications-act-of-1934

10.  "The Public Interest Standard in Television Broadcasting." Retrieved from: https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/piac/novmtg/pubint.htm

11.  Brotman, S. (March 9, 2022). "Revisiting the broadcast public interest standard in communications law and regulation." Brookings Institution. Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/research/revisiting-the-broadcast-public-interest-standard-in-communications-law-and-regulation/

12.  Encyclopedia Britannica. "Communications Act of 1934 | Definition, History, & Federal Communications Commission." Retrieved from: https://www.britannica.com/event/Communications-Act-of-1934

13.  Brookings Institution. (March 9, 2022). "90 years later, the broadcast public interest standard remains ill-defined." Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/03/23/90-years-later-the-broadcast-public-interest-standard-remains-ill-defined/

14.  Ballotpedia. "Communications Act of 1934." Retrieved from: https://ballotpedia.org/Communications_Act_of_1934

15.  Federal Communications Commission. "The Public and Broadcasting." Retrieved from: https://www.fcc.gov/media/radio/public-and-broadcasting

ATSC 3.0 and DRM Issues

16.  Channels Community. (January 24, 2024). "ATSC 3.0 DRM status update." Retrieved from: https://community.getchannels.com/t/atsc-3-0-drm-status-update/38933

17.  Change.org Petition. (July 9, 2023). "Save Free TV! Tell the FCC to END DRM Encryption of ATSC 3.0 Broadcasts." Retrieved from: https://www.change.org/p/tell-the-fcc-no-drm-encryption-of-atsc-3-0-broadcasts

18.  Seidman, L. (July 18, 2023). "ATSC 3 DRM Update - We're on the FCC Docket!" Retrieved from: https://blog.lon.tv/2023/07/18/atsc-3-drm-update-were-on-the-fcc-docket/

19.  Seidman, L. (November 7, 2023). "ATSC 3 DRM Update: No Plan for Gateway Devices and some DRM Certified TVs Don't Work." Retrieved from: https://blog.lon.tv/2023/11/07/atsc-3-drm-update-no-plan-for-gateway-devices-and-some-drm-certified-tvs-dont-work/

20.  Consumer Action Taskforce. "ATSC 3.0." Retrieved from: https://wiki.rossmanngroup.com/index.php?title=ATSC_3.0

21.  Seidman, L. (March 25, 2025). "ATSC 3.0 Update: The CTA Opposes Broadcasters' Request for Tuner Mandate." Retrieved from: https://blog.lon.tv/2025/03/25/atsc-3-0-update-the-cta-opposes-broadcasters-request-for-tuner-mandate/

22.  Seidman, L. "ATSC 3.0 Archives." Retrieved from: https://blog.lon.tv/tag/atsc-3-0/

23.  Seidman, L. (October 23, 2024). "ATSC 3.0 Encryption Limits Consumer Choice." Retrieved from: https://blog.lon.tv/2024/10/23/atsc-3-0-encryption-limits-consumer-choice/

24.  Cord Cutters News. (June 23, 2023). "The Team Behind NextGen ATSC 3.0 OTA TV Explains Why DRM is Needed For Free OTA TV." Retrieved from: https://cordcuttersnews.com/the-team-behind-nextgen-atsc-3-0-ota-tv-explains-why-drm-is-needed-for-free-ota-tv/

25.  AVS Forum. "ATSC Technology Group Report: DRM Guidelines." Retrieved from: https://www.avsforum.com/threads/atsc-technology-group-report-drm-guidelines.3269146/

26.  Newman, J. (March 5, 2024). "DRM remains a stumbling block for DVRs embracing ATSC 3.0." TechHive. Retrieved from: https://www.techhive.com/article/2250871/drm-remains-a-stumbling-block-for-dvrs-embracing-atsc-3-0.html

27.  Newman, J. (July 28, 2023). "NextGen TV's DRM puts future of the over-the-air DVR in doubt." TechHive. Retrieved from: https://www.techhive.com/article/2009693/nextgen-tv-drm-puts-future-of-the-over-the-air-dvr-in-doubt.html

28.  Hacker News Discussion. "The FCC responds to my ATSC 3 encryption complaint – they want to hear from you." Retrieved from: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36713037

29.  TV Technology. (August 29, 2024). "Mediaproxy Adds A3SA Compliant Decryption Feature for ATSC 3.0." Retrieved from: https://www.tvtechnology.com/news/mediaproxy-adds-a3sa-compliant-decryption-feature-for-atsc-30

30.  ATSC. "ATSC Recommended Practice: DRM." Retrieved from: https://www.atsc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/A362-2022-03-RP-DRM.pdf

31.  Communications Daily. (July 14, 2023). "Broadcasters, ATSC 3.0 Early Adopters Disagree on DRM." Retrieved from: https://communicationsdaily.com/news/2023/07/14/Broadcasters-ATSC-30-Early-Adopters-Disagree-on-DRM-2307130057

 

Apendix B: ATSC 3.0: A Technical Summary

Core Technology

ATSC 3.0 (also known as NextGen TV) is the latest digital television broadcast standard developed by the Advanced Television Systems Committee. It's described as "a suite of voluntary technical Standards and Recommended Practices that is fundamentally different from predecessor ATSC systems and is therefore largely incompatible with them."

The technology uses a bootstrap signal as its foundation. This bootstrap signal "allows a receiver to discover and identify the signals that are being transmitted" and "has a fixed configuration that can allow for new signal types to be used in the future."

Technical Specifications

Physical Layer

ATSC 3.0 employs a completely different transmission method than previous standards:

The system uses "a highly efficient physical layer that is based on orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) modulation with low-density parity-check code (LDPC) forward error correction (FEC)." This is a significant change from the 8VSB modulation used in ATSC 1.0.

With a standard 6 MHz channel, "the bit rate can vary from 1 to 57 Mbit/s depending on the parameters that are used." This represents a substantial increase in potential data capacity compared to ATSC 1.0's fixed 19.4 Mbps.

Encoding Standards

ATSC 3.0 implements modern compression and encoding standards:

For video: "HEVC (ITU-R H.265), with a color subsampling of 4:2:0 and maximum spatial resolution of 2160 x 3840 pixels (4K - 2160p)."

The standard supports "higher frame rates, up to 120 frames per second" and adds "wide color gamut data and high dynamic range (HDR) metadata."

For audio, ATSC 3.0 uses the "AC-4" codec.

Network Architecture

ATSC 3.0 is built on Internet Protocol (IP) infrastructure:

Data is delivered using "either DASH (Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol) segments over ROUTE-DASH (Real-Time Object Delivery over Unidirectional Transport) or MPU packets (Media Processing Units) over MMTP (MPEG Media Transport protocol)."

The system uses ALP (ATSC Link Layer Protocol) to channel different data types "for delivery down to the physical layer in the transmitting end and back to the network layer at the receiving end."

Physical Layer Pipes (PLPs)

A key innovation in ATSC 3.0 is the use of PLPs:

The standard is "limited to 64 physical layer pipes (PLP) with a recommended 4 simultaneous PLPs per complete delivered product. The PLPs in a channel may each have different robustness levels."

This feature "allows broadcasters to balance the quality of their various services against the distances of their transmissions."

Consumer Benefits

The enhancements in ATSC 3.0 translate to several viewer benefits:

Viewers can get "high-resolution, high dynamic range (HDR) content from favorite TV channels for free, using an antenna."

The standard enables "advanced emergency alerting including hyperlocalization, evacuation route maps, and 'wake up' function for powered-off receivers in emergency situations."

ATSC 3.0 also "makes it possible to watch broadcast video on mobile devices like phones and tablets, as well as in cars."

References

1.      Advanced Television Systems Committee. (2024, April 3). "A/300:2024-04, ATSC 3.0 System." https://www.atsc.org/atsc-documents/a3002019-atsc-3-0-system/

2.      Wikipedia. (2025, April 10). "ATSC 3.0." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ATSC_3.0

3.      PROMAX. "ATSC 3.0 technical overview." https://www.promaxelectronics.com/ing/news/608/atsc-3-technical-overview/

4.      Digital Trends. (2024, December 28). "ATSC 3.0: Everything you need to know about the over-the-air broadcast standard." https://www.digitaltrends.com/home-theater/atsc-3-0-ota-broadcast-standard-4k-dolby-atmos/

5.      Comcast Technology Solutions. "What is ATSC 3.0? The difference between ATSC and NTSC." https://www.comcasttechnologysolutions.com/what-is-atsc-3.0

6.      Tom's Guide. (2021, July 7). "ATSC 3.0 explained: How NextGen TV will deliver 4K HDR broadcasts for free." https://www.tomsguide.com/reference/atsc-30-explained

7.      TV Technology. (2023, January 5). "Learning About ATSC 3.0—On the Web or On the Bench." https://www.tvtechnology.com/opinion/learning-about-atsc-30on-the-web-or-on-the-bench

 

Appendix C: DRM Encryption in ATSC 3.0

Technical Summary

Based on my research, here's a simple summary of how DRM encryption works in ATSC 3.0, with formal citations:

Overview and Governance

ATSC 3.0 includes Digital Rights Management (DRM) capabilities as part of its security framework, which is managed by the ATSC 3.0 Security Authority (A3SA). The A3SA "enables and operationalizes" security protections in ATSC 3.0 broadcast services by providing "device manufacturers and broadcasters with access to standardized protection and security credentials that enable secure delivery of high-value television content."

Technical Framework

The technical specifications for DRM in ATSC 3.0 are primarily defined in two standards documents:

1.      A/360: "Security and Service Protection" - This is the primary standard that defines encryption for broadcasters, finalized on January 9, 2018.

2.      A/362: "Digital Rights Management (DRM)" - This is a Recommended Practice that "provides best industry practices for implementers of ATSC Standard A/360 and the security and content protection provisions of A/344 (ATSC 3.0 Interactive Content)."

Implementation Architecture

The DRM implementation in ATSC 3.0 uses a web-based approach:

The encryption model ensures that "content protection must use secure cryptographic methodologies with a secure 'key' only available to the broadcaster's licensed protection equipment and the viewer's separately licensed receiver."

For the DRM implementation, A3SA has selected "Google's Widevine" as its exclusive DRM technology, with "no current plans to otherwise support other methods of decryption."

The implementation appears to be based on the W3C's Encrypted Media Extensions (EME) standard, which "provides a communication channel between web browsers and the Content Decryption Module (CDM) software which implements digital rights management (DRM)."

Technical Restrictions

The DRM implementation imposes several technical restrictions:

According to SiliconDust, a manufacturer of ATSC 3.0 tuners, the DRM is "used by select broadcasters to block out-of-home viewing, limit what player devices can be used to watch TV, enforce that the original tuner hardware is always present to view recordings, and to block third party apps. Optionally a broadcaster can force recordings to expire after a period of time and/or block recording completely."

The A3SA has released specifications for DVR functionality that still contain restrictions, as "it allows broadcasters to block or set time limits on recordings for ATSC 3.0-exclusive channels."

Device Compatibility

The choice of Widevine has created significant compatibility issues:

The ATSC 3.0 DRM implementation does not work on Apple devices because "ATSC 3.0 uses Google Widevine DRM encryption which is a competitor to Apple FairPlay DRM encryption." Similarly, it doesn't work on Microsoft platforms because Widevine is "a competitor to Microsoft PlayReady DRM encryption."

Even for devices that support Widevine (like Roku and LG TVs), there are "other A3SA requirements that cannot be met by an installable app," which limits playback of encrypted content to built-in tuners rather than external devices.

Claimed Security Benefits

The A3SA claims these features help with "prevention of attacks" by "verifying the source of the content with certified and secure signatures" and deterring "content theft (or piracy)" through "robust protection and associated license compliance rules."

In addition to content protection through DRM, the ATSC 3.0 security framework includes "Signaling Security" based on standards A/331 (signal delivery) and A/360 (cryptographic signing), "Application security" (CTA-CEB 32.9), and "Studio-to-Transmitter security" (A/324).

References

1.      ATSC. "A/360:2024-04, ATSC 3.0 Security and Service Protection." https://www.atsc.org/atsc-documents/3602018-atsc-3-0-security-service-protection/

2.      ATSC. "A/362:2024-04a, Digital Rights Management (DRM)." https://www.atsc.org/atsc-documents/a-3622020-atsc-recommended-practice-digital-rights-management-drm/

3.      A3SA. "ATSC 3.0 Security Standard." https://a3sa.com/atsc-security-standard/

4.      A3SA (ATSC 3.0 Security Authority). "Security for Next Generation Television." https://a3sa.com/

5.      SiliconDust Forum. "Encryption - ATSC 3.0 DRM." https://forum.silicondust.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=78888

6.      Newman, J. (March 5, 2024). "DRM remains a stumbling block for DVRs embracing ATSC 3.0." TechHive. https://www.techhive.com/article/2250871/drm-remains-a-stumbling-block-for-dvrs-embracing-atsc-3-0.html

7.      Wikipedia. "ATSC 3.0." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ATSC_3.0

8.      Wikipedia. "Encrypted Media Extensions." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encrypted_Media_Extensions

9.      Piracy Monitor. (February 20, 2020). "ATSC 3.0 and anti-piracy: are DRM and encryption enough?" https://piracymonitor.org/atsc-3-0-and-anti-piracy-is-encryption-enough/

 

Appendix D: Google's Role in ATSC 3.0 Distribution

The use of Google's Widevine DRM gives Google a significant role in the ATSC 3.0 ecosystem, though it's not complete control over program distribution. The relationship works as follows:

1.      Licensing Relationship: Manufacturers who want to build ATSC 3.0 receivers with DRM capability must license Widevine technology from Google, giving Google a gatekeeper role for compliant hardware.

2.      Technical Dependency: The A3SA (ATSC 3.0 Security Authority) has selected Widevine as its exclusive DRM solution, creating a technical dependency on Google's proprietary technology.

3.      Certification Control: A3SA controls the certification process for ATSC 3.0 devices, but since they've mandated Widevine, Google effectively has veto power over which devices can be certified to receive encrypted content.

Internet Connectivity Requirements

Based on the technical specifications, ATSC 3.0 receivers with DRM capability do require internet connectivity, but with some nuance:

1.      For Initial Authorization: Receivers need internet connectivity for the initial DRM authorization process when first set up.

2.      For Some Ongoing Functions: The SiliconDust documentation indicates that "multi-room DVR setups" require an internet connection, suggesting that certain functions are dependent on continued connectivity.

3.      Basic Reception: For basic viewing on a certified television with a built-in tuner, it appears that continuous internet connectivity may not be required after initial setup, though this point isn't completely clear in the documentation.

Google Account Requirements

The available documentation doesn't explicitly state that users need Google accounts to use ATSC 3.0 receivers with DRM. However:

1.      CDM Implementation: Since Widevine is implemented as a Content Decryption Module (CDM) following the W3C Encrypted Media Extensions specification, it operates at a system level rather than requiring direct user authentication.

2.      Device-Level Authentication: The authentication appears to happen at the device level rather than the user level, with the device itself being certified to use the DRM system.

3.      Data Collection Possibility: Even without requiring a Google account, the use of Widevine potentially enables data collection about viewing habits that could be associated with device identifiers.

Broader Implications

This arrangement raises several concerns:

1.      Single Point of Control: By using a single proprietary DRM system, the ATSC 3.0 ecosystem becomes vulnerable to changes in Google's business priorities or licensing terms.

2.      Interoperability Barriers: As evidenced by the incompatibility with Apple and Microsoft platforms, the choice of Widevine creates significant barriers to interoperability across different technology ecosystems.

3.      Public Resource Privatization: There's a fundamental tension between the public nature of broadcast spectrum and the privatization of access control through proprietary DRM technology.

The current implementation essentially gives Google significant technical influence over a broadcast standard being deployed on public airwaves, which represents a substantial shift from previous broadcast standards that didn't rely on proprietary third-party technologies for basic access.