Pentagon terminating JCIDS process as part of larger acquisition reform: Memo   - Breaking Defense


Pentagon Terminates JCIDS Process in Major Acquisition Reform

Defense leadership moves to accelerate weapons fielding through streamlined requirements validation

WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Deputy Secretary Steve Feinberg have terminated the controversial Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process as part of a sweeping acquisition reform aimed at rapidly fielding new warfighting capabilities.

In an Aug. 20 memo titled "Reforming the Joint Requirements Process to Accelerate Fielding of Warfighting Capabilities," Pentagon leadership outlined a comprehensive overhaul of how military requirements are validated, promising to field "new technology and capabilities faster" while reducing bureaucratic barriers that have plagued defense procurement for decades.

Major Structural Changes

The reform eliminates JCIDS—the joint staff process responsible for identifying capability gaps and validating joint requirements—while restructuring the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which will cease validating component-level requirement documents. The JROC, comprising the vice chiefs of each military service and chaired by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has long been criticized for creating bureaucratic bottlenecks.

Replacing these structures, the Pentagon will establish a Requirements and Resourcing Alignment Board (RRAB) co-chaired by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the deputy defense secretary. The RRAB will focus on top-ranked Key Operational Problems (KOPs) each budget cycle, issuing programming guidance and recommending funding allocation from the newly created Joint Acceleration Reserve (JAR).

The reform also creates a Mission Engineering and Integration Activity (MEIA) within 120 days, designed to conduct rapid capability integration while engaging industry earlier in the development process. The MEIA will prioritize KOPs identified by the JROC and create experimentation campaigns to accelerate new capabilities.

Industry and Expert Response

The acquisition reform has received largely positive feedback from former officials and defense experts, who have long advocated for JCIDS elimination.

"By shutting down JCIDS, individual services again have validation authority over their bigger-ticket programs," said William Greenwalt, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and former deputy undersecretary of defense for industrial policy. "The move could ultimately cut through red tape and endless stacks of joint validated memos that wither on the shelf."

Former Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall expressed general agreement with the changes, telling Breaking Defense the JROC and JCIDS process had "provided a lot of bureaucracy with very little added value."

Mark Cancian, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, called the memo a "major change" consistent with recent reforms giving military departments greater initiative in acquisition decisions.

Congressional Parallel Efforts

The Pentagon's reform coincides with similar initiatives from Congress. The House Armed Services Committee has proposed transforming the JROC into a Joint Requirements Council (JRC) through the SPEED Act (Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery), which would cut requirements timeline from 800 days to approximately five months.

Under the House proposal, the JRC would focus on evaluating threats and future force design rather than validating specific capability documents. A new Requirements, Acquisition, and Programming Integration Directorate (RAPID) would evaluate technological options and costs before providing recommendations to the deputy defense secretary.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has advanced its own acquisition reform through the FORGED Act, which would expand commercial procurement processes and reduce regulatory burdens on nontraditional defense contractors.

Questions About Oversight and Jointness

Despite broad support for reform, some officials have raised concerns about maintaining adequate oversight and ensuring joint interoperability. A senior service official, speaking anonymously, noted that while the changes would accelerate requirements processes, the eliminated "gate was an important one for rigor."

"The joint force needed some visibility with the services we're building and delivering, and the JROC provided that visibility," the official said, citing potential problems such as the Army procuring smaller drones optimized for different theaters when combatant commanders require capabilities suitable for vast Indo-Pacific distances.

The reform raises fundamental questions about balancing speed with ensuring services don't develop capabilities exclusive to their branch that lack compatibility with joint operations.

Historical Context

JCIDS was established in 2003 to formalize Pentagon requirements processes and ensure new systems could serve the broader joint force rather than individual services. The system was designed to give combatant commanders greater voice in development, ensure interoperability, and encourage innovation.

However, critics have long argued that JCIDS created bureaucratic obstacles rather than streamlined processes. Eric Felt, former director of architecture and integration in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, noted that "the most successful recent programs have all been 'JCIDS exempt' for one reason or another."

Implementation Timeline

The reform creates a compressed timeline for implementation, with the MEIA required to be operational within 120 days. The RRAB will begin operating with the next budget cycle, selecting priority topics and recommending JAR funding allocation.

The effectiveness of these changes will likely be tested as Pentagon leadership, already facing internal turbulence with multiple staff departures, attempts to implement comprehensive structural reforms while maintaining operational readiness and addressing ongoing global security challenges.

Looking Ahead

The acquisition reform represents the most significant restructuring of Pentagon requirements processes in decades, potentially affecting hundreds of billions of dollars in defense spending. Success will depend on the Pentagon's ability to maintain joint integration while accelerating capability development, and on Congress's willingness to align its own reform efforts with the new Defense Department structure.

As both chambers of Congress work toward reconciling their respective NDAA versions, the final form of requirements reform—whether following the Pentagon's model or congressional alternatives—will significantly impact how the U.S. military develops and fields capabilities for future conflicts.


SIDEBAR: Understanding JCIDS - Two Decades of Defense Requirements

What is JCIDS?

The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was established in 2003 to replace the Requirements Generation System, formalizing how the Pentagon identifies capability gaps and validates requirements for new military systems. The system was designed to ensure all new capabilities could serve the joint force rather than individual services.

Historical Origins

JCIDS emerged from lessons learned during Operation Desert Storm (1991), which highlighted interoperability problems between military services. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 had already emphasized jointness, but Desert Storm demonstrated the need for systematic requirements coordination.

Key drivers for JCIDS creation included:

  • Joint Vision 2010/2020: Defense planning documents emphasizing integrated operations
  • 9/11 Attacks: Urgency for better intelligence sharing and joint capabilities
  • Transformation Agenda: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's push for military modernization
  • Interoperability Gaps: Service-specific systems that couldn't communicate effectively

Major Programs Under JCIDS

Several significant acquisition programs were developed under JCIDS validation:

Successful Programs:

  • Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Rapid fielding during Iraq War, though initially developed outside traditional JCIDS timelines
  • Joint Strike Fighter (F-35): Multi-service fighter program, despite cost and schedule challenges
  • V-22 Osprey: Joint tiltrotor aircraft for Marines and Air Force
  • Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3): Missile defense upgrades
  • Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM): GPS-guided bomb kits

Troubled Programs:

  • Future Combat Systems (FCS): Army modernization program cancelled in 2009 after $18 billion investment
  • Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle: Marine Corps amphibious vehicle cancelled in 2011
  • Combat Rescue Helicopter: Multiple restarts and delays
  • Presidential Helicopter Replacement (VH-71): Cancelled due to cost overruns

Chronic Problems with JCIDS

Bureaucratic Delays:

  • Requirements validation averaging 800+ days
  • Multiple review layers and approval gates
  • Extensive documentation requirements creating "analysis paralysis"
  • Coordination across multiple stakeholders and organizations

Mission Creep:

  • Initial requirements expanding during development
  • Services adding capabilities beyond original specifications
  • "Gold-plating" syndrome driving up costs and complexity
  • Difficulty freezing requirements for stable development

Interservice Conflicts:

  • Services protecting traditional roles and missions
  • Competing priorities for limited resources
  • Different operational concepts and requirements
  • Resistance to joint solutions that might reduce service autonomy

Industry Frustration:

  • Unclear or changing requirements
  • Extended development timelines reducing innovation incentive
  • Risk-averse acquisition culture
  • Preference for established contractors over new entrants

The "JCIDS Exempt" Phenomenon

Many successful recent programs avoided JCIDS processes:

  • Special Operations Command programs: Direct congressional funding
  • Rapid acquisition authorities: Emergency wartime capabilities
  • Commercial off-the-shelf purchases: Standard commercial products
  • Prototype programs: Experimental and demonstration projects

This pattern suggested JCIDS was becoming an impediment rather than enabler of capability development.

Reform Attempts

Multiple efforts to fix JCIDS included:

  • 2008: Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act
  • 2010: Better Buying Power initiatives
  • 2016: Defense Innovation Initiative
  • 2018: National Defense Strategy implementation
  • 2021: Adaptive Acquisition Framework

Despite numerous reform efforts, fundamental problems persisted, leading to the current decision to terminate the system entirely.


Sources:

  1. Roque, Ashley, Theresa Hitchens, and Valerie Insinna. "Pentagon terminating JCIDS process as part of larger acquisition reform: Memo." Breaking Defense, August 22, 2025. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/08/pentagon-terminating-jcids-process-as-part-of-larger-acquisition-reform-memo/
  2. Staff, Breaking Defense. "HASC leaders release new defense acquisition reform plan to SPEED weapons buying." Breaking Defense, June 9, 2025. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/hasc-leaders-release-new-defense-acquisition-reform-plan-to-speed-weapons-buying/
  3. Harper, Jon. "House Armed Services leaders unveil bill to reform defense acquisition, speed up requirements process." DefenseScoop, June 10, 2025. https://defensescoop.com/2025/06/09/house-armed-services-bill-speed-act-defense-acquisition-requirements-process/
  4. Staff, Breaking Defense. "Senate NDAA to keep acquisition reform provisions boosting nontraditional defense firms: Official." Breaking Defense, July 11, 2025. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/senate-ndaa-to-keep-acquisition-reform-provisions-boosting-nontraditional-defense-firms-official/
  5. Losey, Stephen. "'Burn it down': Experts urge ditching sluggish Pentagon arms process." Defense News, February 10, 2025. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2025/02/10/burn-it-down-experts-urge-ditching-sluggish-pentagon-arms-process/
  6. Perez, Lisbeth. "Senate, House FY 2026 NDAA Bills Lay Out Differing AI Paths." MeriTalk, 2025. https://www.meritalk.com/articles/senate-house-fy-2026-ndaa-bills-lay-out-differing-ai-paths/
  7. Staff, Executive Gov. "HASC Passes FY 2026 Defense Authorization Bill." Executive Gov, July 16, 2025. https://executivegov.com/articles/hasc-mike-rogers-fy26-ndaa-defense-acquisition-reform-innovation
  8. NewSpace Nexus. Original Pentagon memo publication, August 2025.
  9. Department of Defense. "Mission Engineering Guidance Provides Framework for Work With Industry." DoD News, November 2020. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2435878/mission-engineering-guidance-provides-framework-for-work-with-industry/
  10. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Mission Capabilities. "Mission Engineering Guide v2.0." Pentagon, October 2023. https://ac.cto.mil/mission-engineering/
  11. Pentagon terminating JCIDS process as part of larger acquisition reform: Memo   - Breaking Defense

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