To Win the Fight, We Must First Win the Mind: Create NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting | Center for International Maritime Security

To Win the Fight, We Must First Win the Mind: Create NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting | Center for International Maritime Security

Navy Needs New Warfighting Doctrine to Teach Sailors How to Think in Combat, Senior Officer Says

Captain argues current manuals tell Sailors what to do but not how to make life-or-death decisions under fire

By Naval Staff

Every Sailor facing combat at sea confronts the same brutal reality: you must make critical decisions with incomplete information, under time pressure, while the enemy actively works to kill you. Yet the U.S. Navy has no doctrinal publication that teaches Sailors how to think through these moments.

That's the stark assessment from Captain Paul Nickell, who recently served as a Military Professor at the Naval War College and is now preparing to command Naval Air Station Lemoore. Writing in the Center for International Maritime Security, Nickell calls for creating NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting—a new doctrine focused entirely on the mental game of naval combat.

"We have manuals that describe our ships, our weapons, and our procedures," Nickell writes. "What we don't have is a doctrine that teaches Sailors how to think when everything goes wrong."

The Problem: Manuals Don't Prepare You for Chaos

The Navy's current foundational doctrine, NDP-1 Naval Warfare, describes what naval forces do. It covers everything from force composition to operational concepts. But according to Nickell, it doesn't address the fundamental challenge every combat leader faces: making decisions when you're uncertain, when the situation is changing rapidly, and when mistakes cost lives.

"The central challenge of modern naval warfare is grappling with profound decision-making under uncertainty," Nickell argues. "Our current doctrine is an essential description of our forces, but it is insufficient as a guide for thinking through the friction, fluidity, and ambiguity inherent in conflict."

Consider a scenario familiar to any surface warfare officer: your ship detects multiple contacts in contested waters. Intelligence is contradictory. Rules of engagement are complex. Communications are degraded. The tactical picture is incomplete. What do you do?

Current Navy doctrine tells you what systems you have and what procedures to follow. It doesn't teach you how to think through the problem—how to accept uncertainty, how to act decisively with incomplete information, how to adapt when your initial plan fails.

The Marine Corps Model: A Doctrine That Changed Everything

Nickell points to a proven model: the Marine Corps' MCDP-1 Warfighting. To understand what the Navy is missing, it's worth examining what made the Marine Corps document revolutionary.

Published in 1989 under Commandant General Alfred M. Gray, MCDP-1 is a slim 88-page volume that transformed how Marines think about combat. Unlike technical manuals or tactical publications, it reads almost like philosophy. The opening chapter, "The Nature of War," begins by explaining that war is fundamentally a violent clash of wills characterized by friction, uncertainty, fluidity, and disorder.

MCDP-1 teaches that combat is inherently chaotic and that no plan survives contact with the enemy. It explains why: because war involves thinking adversaries who actively work to deceive and disrupt you, because human factors like fear and fatigue degrade performance, because friction—the accumulated obstacles and unexpected difficulties—makes everything harder than it seems.

The Marine Corps doctrine then presents maneuver warfare as the solution: operating at a faster tempo than the enemy, creating uncertainty for them while accepting uncertainty ourselves, empowering junior leaders to seize opportunities without waiting for orders, and focusing on enemy weaknesses rather than attacking strength.

Most importantly, MCDP-1 makes explicit that Marines at every rank are expected to think, decide, and act. A lance corporal fire team leader is a tactical decision-maker. A squad leader must understand the commander's intent two levels up so they can adapt when the situation changes. Officers must trust their NCOs and junior Marines to solve problems without detailed instructions.

The Marine Corps literally requires every Marine to read MCDP-1 during training. It's discussed in professional military education courses from corporal to general. Marines reference it in planning sessions and after-action reviews. Over three decades, it has created a common language and shared mental model for how Marines approach combat.

What Navy Doctrine Would Look Like—And How It Would Be Different

While MCDP-1 provides the template, NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting would need to address the unique nature of combat at sea. The differences matter enormously for how Sailors would apply the doctrine.

The Technological Dimension: Marines maneuver across terrain with relatively simple weapons and direct human control. Naval warfare involves layers of complex, interconnected systems—radars, data links, weapon systems, propulsion plants—all operated by specialized teams. A Navy warfighting doctrine must address how to think clearly when you're making decisions through technological interfaces, when sensor data may be spoofed or jammed, when systems can fail at critical moments.

For a Sailor in Combat Information Center, this means understanding that the tactical picture on your display is an interpretation of reality, not reality itself. It means recognizing when to trust automation and when to trust human judgment. The doctrine would need to explain how to make decisions when your primary tools are computer screens and radio circuits rather than direct observation.

The Scale and Tempo: Ground combat typically occurs over distances measured in meters or kilometers. Naval combat spans hundreds of miles, with weapons that can strike targets beyond visual range in seconds. MCDP-1 discusses seizing fleeting opportunities; NDP-1.1 would need to address decisions that must be made in compressed timeframes with adversaries you may never see.

A cruiser conducting air defense may have 90 seconds or less to evaluate threats, determine hostile intent, and engage targets at ranges exceeding 200 miles. There's no time for deliberative analysis or consulting higher authority. The doctrine must prepare Sailors to make life-or-death decisions in these compressed cycles while accepting the risk of mistakes.

The Team Dimension: A Marine rifle squad can operate semi-independently with a dozen Marines. A destroyer requires 300 Sailors working as an integrated team across multiple watch stations, each with specialized knowledge. Naval warfare is inherently a team sport where no single person has complete situational awareness.

NDP-1.1 would need to address distributed cognition—how teams think together. It would explain how the commanding officer must trust the tactical action officer's judgment on combat decisions while the TAO trusts the fire controlman's assessment of system status. It would codify how information flows through the chain of command and when subordinates should act without consultation.

For a chief petty officer in the chiefs' mess, this means understanding their role in developing decision-making confidence in junior Sailors. For a department head, it means recognizing that effective combat performance depends on every watchstander knowing their authority and responsibility.

The Maritime Environment: The ocean is fundamentally unforgiving in ways that land is not. Ships can sink. Sailors can't withdraw from a damaged vessel in the middle of the Pacific. Weather and sea state affect operations constantly. The environment itself is a threat that interacts with combat damage in complex ways.

Where MCDP-1 discusses terrain and weather as tactical factors, NDP-1.1 would need to address the maritime environment as a persistent challenge that affects every decision. A Navy warfighting doctrine would explain how environmental awareness must integrate with tactical thinking—how the commanding officer balances mission accomplishment against ship safety, how to make offensive decisions while maintaining defensive readiness.

The Strategic Weight: Individual Marine units rarely carry weapons that can trigger strategic consequences. Navy ships routinely do. A single Tomahawk strike can have strategic implications. A mistake in identification can sink a neutral vessel and create an international incident. Rules of engagement are often complex specifically because naval weapons have such long reach and devastating effects.

NDP-1.1 would need to address operating at the tactical-strategic interface. It would explain how to maintain initiative and aggressive action while exercising appropriate restraint, how to interpret commander's intent in the context of strategic guidance, when to seek clarification versus when to act. This is fundamentally different from the Marine Corps context where tactical actions rarely have immediate strategic consequences.

What This Would Mean on the Deckplates

Translating these concepts into a Navy-specific warfighting doctrine would produce practical differences in how Sailors think and act.

A second class petty officer standing Engineering Officer of the Watch would understand that when a casualty occurs, they're expected to assess, decide, and act based on their understanding of the ship's mission and the commanding officer's intent. They don't wait for the Engineer to tell them every step. The doctrine would validate that they have the authority—and responsibility—to make decisions within their scope.

An officer of the deck would grasp that their job isn't to follow procedures mechanically but to exercise judgment about how those procedures apply in specific situations. When another vessel maneuvers unexpectedly, the OOD must think through multiple factors—navigation safety, tactical considerations, international law, the CO's standing orders—and make a decision. NDP-1.1 would provide the framework for that thinking.

A strike fighter pilot launching from a carrier would understand their place in a distributed combat system where initiative matters but coordination is essential. The doctrine would clarify when to press an attack versus when to fall back, how to interpret tactical guidance versus strict orders, what their commander needs to know versus what they can decide independently.

A commanding officer would have doctrinal backing to push decision-making down to the lowest appropriate level rather than personally controlling every action. The CO would understand that developing decision-making competence throughout the crew isn't just good leadership—it's a doctrinal requirement for combat effectiveness.

Three Things NDP-1.1 Must Do

Building on the Marine Corps model while addressing naval warfare's unique character, Nickell's proposed doctrine would be built on three principles that directly affect how Sailors fight:

First: Teach a philosophy of action, not just procedures. The doctrine must emphasize initiative, adaptation, and making decisions even when you're not certain. It should prepare Sailors to act in the fog of war rather than following checklists that won't survive first contact with the enemy.

Unlike MCDP-1's focus on maneuver warfare, NDP-1.1 would likely center on what could be called "distributed warfare"—combat operations where geographically separated forces must operate as a cohesive whole through shared understanding rather than direct control. The philosophy would emphasize maintaining initiative in an environment where adversaries will work to disrupt your decision-making cycle.

For a junior officer on watch, this means understanding that waiting for perfect information is often the worst decision. For a senior commander, it means trusting subordinates to make calls without constant oversight. For everyone, it means recognizing that initiative and calculated risk-taking are expected, not discouraged.

Second: Explain the nature of naval combat. The doctrine must describe why fighting at sea is uniquely difficult—the vast distances, the complex technology, the unforgiving environment, the speed of modern weapons. Sailors need to understand these fundamental challenges to think clearly about them under pressure.

Where MCDP-1 devotes chapters to friction and uncertainty in general terms, NDP-1.1 would need to make these concepts concrete for the naval context. What does friction look like when it's a degraded radar picture? What does uncertainty mean when you're identifying contacts at 150 miles? How does the fluidity of combat translate to a destroyer defending against cruise missiles?

A cruiser's tactical action officer needs to grasp not just how the Aegis system works, but why the maritime environment makes combat inherently uncertain and chaotic. Understanding the "why" enables better decisions when systems fail or situations change. The doctrine would explain that technology doesn't eliminate uncertainty—it transforms it into different forms that still require human judgment.

Third: Put leadership and decision-making at the center. The doctrine should codify Mission Command—the idea that commanders give subordinates objectives and intent, then trust them to figure out how to accomplish the mission. It should make clear that every Sailor, from seaman to admiral, is responsible for making decisions within their scope of authority.

This means an E-5 damage control team leader understands they're expected to solve problems, not wait for step-by-step instructions during a casualty. It means a commanding officer trusts their officers of the deck to make tactical decisions without second-guessing every call. It means senior leaders provide clear intent and desired end states, then allow subordinate commanders to determine methods.

The Marine Corps can rely on NCO backbone and small-unit leadership cultivated over centuries. The Navy would need to articulate how leadership and decision-making work in a technical, watchstanding environment where authority is formally delegated through watch stations and qualified positions. NDP-1.1 would explain how the Navy's qualification system relates to decision-making authority, how relieving the watch transfers not just responsibility but initiative.

This Isn't About Reading—It's About Training

Nickell emphasizes that simply publishing NDP-1.1 would accomplish nothing. The doctrine must be integrated throughout the Navy's training pipeline, from boot camp to flag officer courses. It should be discussed in wardrooms before deployments, referenced in after-action reports, and used as the foundation for tactical training.

"Publication alone is not enough, it must be formally incorporated into curriculum and training, and deliberately socialized into the fleet," Nickell writes.

This means divisional training should include discussions of decision-making under uncertainty. Department head school should use NDP-1.1 as the basis for tactical scenarios. War college courses should reference it constantly. Chiefs' mess discussions should apply its principles to real situations the crew faces.

At Surface Warfare Officer School, instead of just teaching watchstanding procedures, instructors would use NDP-1.1 to explain why certain decisions matter and how to think through situations not covered by standing orders. At Aviation Training Next, beyond teaching flight procedures, instructors would develop pilot judgment using the doctrinal framework. At Submarine School, along with technical systems, students would learn how the doctrine applies to undersea warfare's unique challenges.

The goal: every Sailor thinks through problems the same way, using a common intellectual framework that values smart, aggressive decision-making. When a petty officer faces an unexpected situation, they'd apply the same mental model as their commanding officer would—not the same answer necessarily, but the same process of thinking through uncertainty, commander's intent, available options, and acceptable risk.

Why This Matters Now

The Navy faces adversaries who've studied American doctrine and planned how to disrupt it. Chinese and Russian forces will target communications, create confusion, and present complex tactical dilemmas designed to paralyze American decision-making.

The People's Liberation Army Navy has specifically developed capabilities to disrupt the networked, centralized command and control that the U.S. Navy has relied upon. They'll jam communications, spoof sensors, and overwhelm data links. In these fights, ships and strike groups may need to operate semi-independently for extended periods, making critical decisions without higher headquarters guidance.

In these fights, the side that makes good decisions faster wins. That requires Sailors at every level who can think clearly under pressure, act with incomplete information, and adapt when plans fall apart. It requires moving away from rigid, centralized control toward distributed decision-making where everyone from seaman to admiral understands their role and authority.

Technical manuals won't teach that. Equipment training won't develop it. Only a warfighting philosophy, thoroughly integrated into training and culture, will build the intellectual foundation the fleet needs.

"To truly place the Sailor front and center, we must first invest in their mind," Nickell concludes. "NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting can provide the enduring intellectual framework to strengthen the Fleet, empower the Foundry's purpose, and master the Way We Fight."

For the CNO looking to define a legacy, Nickell argues, few initiatives would have more lasting impact than teaching every Sailor how to think like a warfighter. The Marine Corps proved that doctrine can transform culture. The Navy has the opportunity to do the same—but only if it commits to developing a warfighting philosophy as sophisticated as the technology its Sailors operate.

Captain Nickell's operational background includes squadron command and developing leaders at the Navy's Leadership and Ethics Command. He holds a graduate degree from the Naval Postgraduate School, where his thesis examined how the Navy can become a better learning organization. He takes command of NAS Lemoore, the Navy's largest master jet base, in 2026.

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Sources

Nickell, Paul. "To Win the Fight, We Must First Win the Mind: Create NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting." Center for International Maritime Security, 2025. https://cimsec.org/to-win-the-fight-we-must-first-win-the-mind-create-ndp-1-1-naval-warfighting/