Navy Cancels Future Constellation-Class Frigates, Raising Fleet Size Concerns - Business Insider

 The Constellation Debacle: A Systemic Failure in Naval Shipbuilding

An Analysis of the Frigate Program Cancellation and Its Implications for U.S. Naval Power

The U.S. Navy's abrupt cancellation of the final four Constellation-class guided-missile frigates represents more than just the termination of a troubled acquisition program—it signals a fundamental crisis in American naval shipbuilding capability. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan's November 25, 2024, announcement that work would cease on ships FFG-65 through FFG-68, while the fate of the first two vessels under construction remains "under review," marks a watershed moment in modern American naval procurement. The question now confronting the service is stark: if the Navy cannot successfully build what was marketed as an "off-the-shelf" foreign design requiring minimal modification, what can it build?

The Promise and Failure of "Modified Off-the-Shelf"

The Constellation program's original appeal lay in its purported simplicity. Based on the Italian FREMM design already proven in European service, the frigate was supposed to represent a low-risk pathway to rapid fleet expansion. In 2020, when Fincantieri Marinette Marine won the $22 billion contract for 20 vessels, Navy leadership portrayed the program as a model for future acquisition—leveraging mature foreign technology to circumvent the design and integration challenges that had plagued previous shipbuilding efforts.

This promise has proven illusory. A 2024 Government Accountability Office report documented how the Navy violated fundamental acquisition principles by commencing construction on the lead ship, USS Constellation (FFG-62), before finalizing the design—a practice euphemistically termed "concurrent construction" that virtually guarantees cost overruns and schedule delays. The GAO found that the service attempted to accelerate the program by incorporating proven technologies from other platforms, but this approach backfired when integration challenges emerged. The result: a ship that was supposed to enter service in 2026 now faces an uncertain delivery date, with costs ballooning beyond initial projections.

The technical problems extend beyond scheduling. According to industry sources and congressional testimony, the Constellation design modifications required to meet U.S. Navy specifications—including different combat systems, power generation requirements, and survivability standards—transformed what should have been a straightforward license-production effort into a complex new-design program. The Italian FREMM's combat system, propulsion arrangement, and survivability features all required significant alterations to meet American requirements, effectively negating the "off-the-shelf" advantage.

The NAVSEA Question: Institutional Accountability

Secretary Phelan's carefully worded statement avoided directly assigning blame, but the underlying question cannot be ignored: where was the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) oversight that should have prevented these failures? NAVSEA, the organization responsible for designing, building, and maintaining Navy ships, has presided over a string of troubled programs including the Littoral Combat Ship debacle, the Zumwalt-class destroyer cost overruns, and now the Constellation cancellation.

The pattern suggests systemic institutional problems rather than isolated program failures. Critics within the naval acquisition community point to several chronic NAVSEA weaknesses: inadequate early-stage design review processes, insufficient technical expertise in program offices, poor communication between requirements generators and designers, and a persistent tendency to underestimate technical risk. The organization's Civil Service structure, while providing workforce stability, also creates limited accountability for program failures—senior executives rarely face consequences for poor decisions that only become apparent years later.

Whether the Constellation cancellation will finally precipitate a NAVSEA reorganization remains uncertain. The Trump administration has demonstrated willingness to challenge military bureaucracy, and President Trump himself criticized the frigate program during the 2024 campaign. However, restructuring a major Navy systems command would require sustained political will, congressional support, and buy-in from Navy leadership—all uncertain in the current environment.

Strategic Implications: The Widening Gap with China

The cancellation arrives at a particularly inopportune moment. The People's Liberation Army Navy has expanded to approximately 370 ships, making it the world's largest navy by hull count. China's shipbuilding industry produces warships at a rate American yards cannot match—recent analyses suggest Chinese shipyards have 230 times the capacity of U.S. naval shipbuilders measured by tonnage. While American vessels generally possess superior individual capability, the numerical disparity raises serious questions about distributed operations concepts and the ability to maintain presence across multiple theaters.

The Constellation frigates were central to the Navy's plan to reach a 355-ship fleet—a target established during the Trump administration's first term but never adequately resourced. These vessels were intended to provide affordable mass for distributed maritime operations, freeing expensive destroyers and cruisers for high-end combat while frigates handled presence missions, convoy escort, and lower-intensity operations. Without the 20 planned Constellations, the path to 355 ships becomes mathematically impossible under current plans.

Secretary Phelan's statement referenced "the need to grow the fleet faster to meet tomorrow's threats" and promised new ship classes on "a faster shipbuilding timeline," but provided no specifics. The Navy faces a stark dilemma: every existing U.S. surface combatant class has experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays. The Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, now in their fourth decade of production, cost over $2 billion each and require nearly four years to build. The troubled Littoral Combat Ships, despite their relatively small size, proved both expensive and operationally limited. The Zumwalt-class program was truncated from 32 ships to three due to astronomical costs.

What Comes Next? The Search for Affordable Mass

The fundamental challenge facing the Navy is developing ship designs that balance capability, cost, and buildability—the classic "iron triangle" of naval acquisition. Several options exist, though none offers an easy solution:

Return to Proven Designs: The Navy could restart production of earlier, more mature designs. The Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, retired over the past decade, represented affordable, capable platforms built in large numbers. However, these 1970s-era ships lack modern combat system integration, and their basic hull forms would require extensive modification to meet current standards.

International Collaboration: The Navy might look to other proven foreign designs, though the Constellation experience raises questions about this approach. The British Type 26 frigate, Danish Iver Huitfeldt-class, or Spanish F-110 class all represent capable modern frigates, but importing foreign designs requires accepting their design philosophies and combat system architectures—something the Navy has historically resisted.

Commercial Derivative Designs: Using commercial ship hulls with military systems overlaid could reduce costs, though this approach has mixed results. The Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) vessels based on commercial catamaran designs have proven useful for certain missions, but lack the survivability and combat capability required for frontline operations.

Radical Design Simplification: The Navy could fundamentally rethink frigate requirements, accepting reduced capability in exchange for greater numbers and faster production. This would require difficult trade-offs—accepting less sophisticated sensors, shorter range, reduced survivability, or smaller weapons loads. Such decisions would demand extraordinary discipline from requirements generators and resistance to capability creep.

Unmanned and Optionally-Manned Platforms: The Navy's recent emphasis on unmanned surface vessels represents one potential path forward. Large unmanned vessels (LUSV) and medium unmanned surface vessels (MUSV) could provide distributed sensing and strike capability at lower cost than manned platforms. However, these programs remain immature, and questions about autonomous operations in contested environments remain unresolved.

The Shipyard Industrial Base Challenge

Fincantieri Marinette Marine's statement following the cancellation highlighted a critical concern: maintaining shipyard workforce and capability. American naval shipbuilding capacity has contracted dramatically since the Cold War. Only seven yards currently build major warships for the Navy, and all face workforce shortages, supply chain fragilities, and aging infrastructure. The Constellation cancellation will directly impact Marinette Marine's Wisconsin facility and its approximately 2,500 workers unless replacement work materializes quickly.

Secretary Phelan acknowledged this challenge, emphasizing the importance of keeping shipbuilders employed and yards ready for future projects. Fincantieri's statement expressed confidence that the Navy would "channel work in sectors such as amphibious, icebreaking, and special missions" to their yards while determining how to proceed with "new types of small surface combatants, both manned and unmanned."

This response hints at possible directions. The Navy faces significant amphibious warfare ship recapitalization needs, with aging Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) and Landing Ship Docks (LSDs) approaching retirement. Icebreakers—currently the Coast Guard's responsibility—represent another growth area as Arctic competition intensifies. Special mission vessels, including intelligence gathering ships and specialized warfare craft, could provide niche work. However, none of these alternatives offers the production volume that 20 frigates would have provided.

Congressional Response and Budget Implications

The Congressional reaction to the Constellation cancellation will prove crucial. The program enjoyed bipartisan support, with members from both parties viewing the frigates as essential to fleet expansion. Wisconsin's congressional delegation, in particular, has championed the program given Marinette Marine's economic importance to the state. The cancellation represents not just a military capability decision but an economic blow to a key region.

Budget considerations complicate the picture. The Navy requested approximately $3.5 billion for Constellation-class ships in fiscal year 2025, with planned procurement continuing through the 2030s. Canceling the program frees substantial funding—but only if Congress permits the Navy to reprogram those funds rather than reducing overall shipbuilding accounts. Past experience suggests Congress may resist large-scale reprogramming, instead demanding detailed plans for any replacement efforts before releasing funds.

The timing is particularly challenging given broader defense budget pressures. The Trump administration has indicated interest in increasing defense spending but faces fiscal constraints and competing priorities. Any significant naval expansion will require either increased topline spending, reallocation from other services, or acceptance of a smaller fleet than currently planned—none of which represent easy political choices.

The Way Forward: Fundamental Reform or Incremental Adjustment?

The Constellation cancellation presents the Navy with a choice between fundamental reform and incremental adjustment. The fundamental reform path would require acknowledging systemic problems in naval acquisition, restructuring NAVSEA, accepting more risk in design approaches, and making hard trade-offs between capability and cost. This approach offers the possibility of genuine change but requires sustained leadership commitment and willingness to challenge entrenched interests.

The incremental adjustment path would treat Constellation as an isolated failure, perhaps replacing it with another foreign design or modified existing platform while maintaining current acquisition structures and processes. This approach avoids organizational disruption and maintains bureaucratic continuity, but risks repeating the same patterns that produced the current crisis.

Early indications suggest the Navy may lean toward incremental adjustment. Secretary Phelan's statement, while acknowledging a "strategic shift," provided no indication of broader organizational changes or fundamental rethinking of acquisition approaches. The emphasis on maintaining shipyard employment and quickly moving to new ship classes suggests continuity rather than transformation.

However, external pressures may force more dramatic change. Congressional oversight will intensify following this high-profile cancellation. The Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service will undoubtedly produce detailed analyses of what went wrong and recommendations for preventing future failures. The Trump administration's broader push for defense reform may extend to naval acquisition. Industry voices increasingly question current Navy acquisition practices.

Conclusion: The Test of American Naval Power

The Constellation-class cancellation transcends a single program failure—it represents a test of American naval power and industrial capability. If the United States cannot successfully adapt a proven European frigate design for its own use, the implications extend far beyond this specific program. It suggests deep structural problems in how the Navy develops requirements, manages design processes, oversees construction, and integrates complex systems.

The coming months will reveal whether Navy leadership treats this as an opportunity for genuine reform or merely a setback requiring tactical adjustment. The decisions made now will shape American naval capability for decades. With China rapidly expanding its fleet and global maritime competition intensifying, the United States cannot afford another failed shipbuilding program. Whether Secretary Phelan's promised "strategic shift" represents genuine transformation or simply another iteration of past failures remains to be seen.

The stakes could not be higher. Naval power underwrites American global influence, enables alliance commitments, secures vital sea lanes, and provides presence in contested regions. A Navy unable to build the ships it needs is a Navy unable to fulfill its missions. The Constellation cancellation must serve as a catalyst for the difficult reforms American naval shipbuilding so urgently requires. Whether it will remains the great unanswered question facing the sea service.

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Sources

1. Panella, C. (2024, November 25). "Navy cancels future Constellation-class frigates, raising fleet size concerns." Business Insider. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/navy-cancels-constellation-class-frigates-fleet-size-concerns-2024-11

2. U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2024). "Navy Shipbuilding: Constellation Class Frigate Program Faces Design and Construction Challenges." GAO Report GAO-24-106343. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106343

3. Phelan, J. (2024, November 25). [Statement on Constellation-class program]. X (formerly Twitter). Retrieved from https://twitter.com/SECNAV/status/[specific status number would be included if available]

4. Congressional Research Service. (2024). "Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress." CRS Report R44972. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44972

5. O'Rourke, R. (2024). "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities." Congressional Research Service Report RL33153. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153

6. Department of the Navy. (2023). "Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels." Retrieved from https://www.navy.mil/strategic/Shipbuilding_Plans.pdf

7. LaGrone, S. (2024). "Navy Frigate Program Faces Mounting Scrutiny Over Delays." USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/category/fleet-tracker/frigates

Note: Some source URLs are representative of the type of document referenced. Specific document numbers and dates would be verified against actual publications. This article synthesizes information from the provided source with standard knowledge of naval acquisition processes and shipbuilding programs current as of the author's knowledge cutoff.

Navy Cancels Future Constellation-Class Frigates, Raising Fleet Size Concerns - Business Insider