Navy Matters: Our Navy For The China War

The Fleet We Need: A Critical Assessment of Naval Force Structure for Indo-Pacific Conflict

By Stephen Pendergast

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

December 2025

The ongoing debate about U.S. Navy force structure for a potential Indo-Pacific conflict with China has intensified as strategic competition deepens and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues its unprecedented expansion. A recent analysis by Blogger Commander Navy Operations provides a provocative framework for this discussion, arguing that much of our current fleet is ill-suited for high-intensity combat operations in the Western Pacific. While this analysis raises several valid points about capability gaps and procurement priorities, a comprehensive assessment reveals both strengths and significant omissions—particularly regarding area denial, hypersonic threats, advanced base operations, and the critical logistics infrastructure required for sustained operations across the vast Indo-Pacific theater.

The Strategic Context

The Western Pacific presents unique operational challenges that distinguish it from any conflict the U.S. Navy has faced since World War II. China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) architecture—anchored by the DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles, increasingly sophisticated air defense networks, a growing submarine fleet, and extensive coastal mining capabilities—creates a contested environment extending well beyond the first island chain.

The Congressional Research Service's August 2024 assessment notes that China's navy is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030, compared to the U.S. Navy's 296 battle force ships as of August 2024.[^1] The PLAN's modernization has been nothing short of revolutionary. In 2024 alone, China launched two Type 055 cruisers, multiple destroyers and frigates, and continued construction on its third aircraft carrier, Fujian, which features electromagnetic catapults enabling launch of heavier aircraft.[^2]

Recent operational displays demonstrate China's growing confidence. In late 2024 and early 2025, the PLAN coordinated over 100 naval and coast guard vessels across the East and South China Seas in unprecedented shows of force.[^3] The Liaoning and Shandong carriers operated together for the first time in the South China Sea, and in 2025, both carrier strike groups operated in the western Pacific beyond the first island chain, with one crossing the second island chain for the first time.[^4]

Offensive Strike Capabilities: The Hypersonic Dimension

The ComNavOps analysis correctly identifies the need for massive, long-range strike capabilities against Chinese mainland targets. The current reliance on the aging BGM-109 Tomahawk, despite ongoing modernization efforts, presents significant vulnerabilities. With subsonic speeds around Mach 0.7 and relatively predictable flight profiles, Tomahawks face increasingly sophisticated Chinese integrated air defense systems.

The Virginia Payload Module (VPM) program, while representing a step forward with 40 additional Tomahawk tubes per submarine, cannot compensate for the retirement of the four Ohio-class SSGNs, each carrying 154 missiles. The mathematics are stark: losing four SSGNs removes 616 strike missiles from the inventory, requiring sixteen VPM-equipped Virginias to match that capacity—submarines we won't have for years.

However, the analysis significantly understates the transformative potential of hypersonic weapons. The Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) system, developed jointly with the Army, successfully completed its first cold-gas launch test at Cape Canaveral in May 2025, marking a critical milestone toward naval deployment.[^5] These weapons, traveling at speeds exceeding Mach 5, dramatically compress Chinese decision timelines and complicate defensive responses.

The Navy plans to integrate CPS onto Zumwalt-class destroyers beginning in fiscal year 2025, with Virginia-class submarines receiving the system around fiscal year 2028.[^6] Each Zumwalt destroyer will be modified to carry 12 CPS missiles in four Large Missile Vertical Launch System modules, replacing the failed Advanced Gun System.[^7] While the Navy requested $341 million for eight hypersonic missiles in FY2024, Congress removed the funding, deferring procurement to FY2026 with plans for six rounds, followed by 22 missiles in FY2027, 16 in FY2028, and 17 in FY2029.[^8]

The most significant omission in the ComNavOps assessment is inadequate treatment of hypersonic threats directed at U.S. forces. China's DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle, reportedly operational since 2019, and the DF-27 intermediate-range ballistic missile with hypersonic capabilities pose existential threats to surface combatants and particularly aircraft carriers. The weapons' combination of speed, maneuverability, and depressed trajectories severely challenges existing Aegis ballistic missile defense systems.

The Navy's current approach relies on the SM-6 missile in terminal defense mode and the emerging Glide Phase Interceptor program, scheduled for initial deployment in the late 2020s. However, robust defense against saturation attacks involving coordinated employment of hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles remains technologically uncertain.

The Taiwan Scenario: Sobering Realities

The ComNavOps analysis assumes "a Guadalcanal-like battle" for Taiwan with carriers providing local air support. This scenario, while perhaps emotionally satisfying, deserves closer scrutiny based on rigorous wargaming conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States, Taiwan, and Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defense came at catastrophic cost.[^9]

Mark Cancian, senior adviser at CSIS and lead author of the study, stated bluntly: "In four weeks of fighting, the United States typically lost hundreds of aircraft, two aircraft carriers and up to two dozen other ships."[^10] The report estimated U.S. casualties at approximately 3,000 service members killed in three weeks—about half the casualties suffered in 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.[^11] China would lose approximately 90% of its amphibious fleet, 52 major surface warships, and 160 warplanes.[^12]

The wargame identified five critical conditions for success:

Taiwan must resist forcefully and effectively
The U.S. must intervene within days with the full range of capabilities
The U.S. must have use of bases in Japan
The U.S. must possess enough long-range anti-ship missiles to attack the Chinese fleet rapidly
Taiwanese ground forces must hold the line and contain beachheads[^13]

"Victory is not enough," the CSIS report concluded. "The high losses would damage the U.S. global position for many years."^14 Recent wargaming of a Chinese blockade scenario, completed in 2025, similarly found that countering a blockade would cost both sides thousands of casualties and hundreds of lost aircraft and ships.[^15]

These sobering conclusions suggest that any Taiwan conflict would be extraordinarily costly regardless of force structure decisions. Defending Taiwan successfully likely requires a strategy emphasizing sea denial rather than sea control—preventing Chinese amphibious forces from successfully landing and sustaining forces on Taiwan rather than attempting to maintain continuous U.S. naval presence in the immediate Taiwan Strait.

Logistics: The Sinew of War

If the ComNavOps analysis has a fatal flaw, it's the superficial treatment of logistics—the foundation upon which all other operations rest. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet (and later nominated to lead Indo-Pacific Command), warned in February 2024 that the Combat Logistics Force operates on "narrow margins."[^16]

"In a peer-to-peer conflict we may be needing to move fuel across thousands of miles of contested oceans," Paparo explained, emphasizing that current capabilities are insufficient.^17 The Military Sealift Command operates approximately 140 civilian-crewed ships that replenish U.S. naval forces, but many are decades old and increasingly unreliable. The fleet oiler force currently comprises approximately 15 Henry J. Kaiser-class ships, most commissioned between 1984 and 1996 and nearing or exceeding their intended service lives.[^18]

The Navy has made progress with the John Lewis-class fleet replenishment oilers, with four delivered and five more under construction as of late 2024.[^19] In November 2025, the Navy awarded General Dynamics NASSCO $1.7 billion to construct two additional oilers (T-AO 215 and T-AO 216), continuing a production line that includes up to eight additional vessels numbered T-AO 214 through T-AO 221.^20 However, this expansion barely keeps pace with retiring Kaiser-class ships.

The 2024 grounding of USNS Big Horn (T-AO-198) near Oman highlighted how the loss of even a single oiler can disrupt refueling cycles for deployed carrier strike groups.[^21] To mitigate capacity gaps, Military Sealift Command has revived Cold War-era practices, outfitting leased commercial tankers with consolidated tanking (CONSOL) connections to refuel military oilers at sea.[^22]

Looking ahead, the Navy is developing a Next Generation Logistics Ship (also called Light Replenishment Oiler) concept, planning to procure up to 13 vessels smaller than existing John Lewis-class oilers but optimized for contested environments under Distributed Maritime Operations doctrine.[^23] The service has also demonstrated underway vertical launch system reload capabilities and continues refining at-sea ammunition transfer concepts demonstrated during Large Scale Global Exercise 2025.^24

Recognizing the magnitude of logistics challenges, the U.S., Australia, and Japan signed a trilateral naval logistics arrangement in July 2025 aboard USS America in Brisbane.[^25] This agreement facilitates mutual logistics support including fuel, munitions, spare parts, and maintenance across the Indo-Pacific. Australian and U.S. Navy forces have supported missile reloading for each other's warships since 2019, with Naval Sea Systems Command developing prototype systems compatible with both U.S. and partner nations' MK-41 missile launchers for transfers in elevated sea states.[^26]

SIDEBAR: The Fuel Crisis - An Existential Vulnerability

The U.S. Navy faces a logistics crisis that goes far beyond oilers and supply ships: there may not be enough fuel available to transport, regardless of how many ships exist to carry it.

The Infrastructure Collapse

While Admiral Paparo correctly warned that the Combat Logistics Force operates on "narrow margins," the situation is actually far more dire. The United States has systematically dismantled the fuel infrastructure essential for Pacific operations:

West Coast Refining Capacity Evaporating: California's refining capacity has collapsed over the past decade. Phillips 66's Los Angeles refinery (139,000 barrels per day) shut down in 2023. Marathon's Martinez refinery (166,000 bpd) converted to renewable diesel in 2022. Phillips 66's Rodeo refinery (120,000 bpd) ceased operations in 2024. Washington state has seen similar reductions. Remaining refineries operate near capacity during peacetime with no surge capability.

Environmental regulations make building new capacity impossible—the last major U.S. refinery was built in 1977. No new capacity can come online in time for any near-term conflict.

The Red Hill Catastrophe: The Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility in Hawaii—250 million gallons of storage capacity positioned precisely where strategically necessary—was ordered permanently closed following 2021 water contamination. Complete defueling was finished in July 2024.

This single facility represented the linchpin of Pacific fuel logistics. Pearl Harbor served as the primary fueling hub between the West Coast and forward-deployed forces. Without Red Hill's massive storage, Hawaii can only hold fuel in smaller, more vulnerable above-ground tanks. Oilers must now make longer runs directly from the West Coast or rely on inadequate Hawaiian stocks.

Strategic Reserve Depletion: The Strategic Petroleum Reserve declined from over 700 million barrels to approximately 350 million following 2022 releases. Moreover, the SPR contains crude oil, not refined products—it requires functional refineries with available capacity to convert crude into usable military fuels.

The Math That Doesn't Work

Consider fuel consumption during high-intensity Pacific operations:

Carrier strike group: 800,000-1,000,000 gallons/day
Marine Expeditionary Brigade: ~400,000 gallons/day
Air operations from Guam and Japan: millions of gallons/day
Amphibious operations: enormous diesel quantities

For a 3-4 week Taiwan scenario (CSIS wargame timeframe), total U.S. military fuel consumption could approach 100-150 million gallons or more. This must come from West Coast refineries already operating near capacity, transported 6,000+ miles across contested ocean, with no strategic reserve depot in Hawaii.

Oiler Cycle Times: A complete cycle—loading at West Coast terminals, transit to Pearl Harbor, transit to operational area, refueling operations, and return—takes 30-40 days per oiler. With only 15-20 operational oilers in the entire inventory, maintaining continuous fuel supply to multiple carrier strike groups simultaneously may be mathematically impossible.

Could the Persian Gulf Help?

The obvious alternative—Persian Gulf petroleum—creates more problems than it solves:

Impossible Distances: Persian Gulf to Philippine Sea is 7,000-8,000 nautical miles. Transit time for a laden tanker: 20-25 days minimum. Round trip cycle: 50-60 days. This offers no advantage over West Coast sources while introducing multiple vulnerabilities.

Fatal Chokepoints: The route requires transit through:

Strait of Hormuz (21 miles wide): Iran has repeatedly threatened closure and possesses the capability through mines, missiles, and small craft swarms
Strait of Malacca (1.7 miles at narrowest): Chinese submarines and long-range missiles could interdict traffic far from U.S. air cover
South China Sea: Effectively enemy waters during U.S.-China conflict

The Iranian Wild Card: In any U.S.-China conflict, Iran faces a strategic choice: neutrality (unlikely given Iranian-Chinese partnership), active interdiction of Strait of Hormuz, or demanding concessions for allowing passage. Any scenario except perfect Iranian cooperation makes Persian Gulf supply unreliable or impossible.

Tanker Availability Crisis: The global petroleum tanker fleet is predominantly foreign-flagged (Panama, Liberia, Marshall Islands). Would these vessels accept contracts to sail into war zones? Would their crews? The U.S.-flagged tanker fleet numbers fewer than 100 vessels total.

Chinese Regional Influence: China is the largest customer for Saudi, Iraqi, and Iranian oil exports and was the architect of the 2023 Saudi-Iranian diplomatic reconciliation. Would Middle Eastern states jeopardize their largest export market to supply U.S. military operations?

Supply Line Defense Paradox: Protecting Persian Gulf-to-Pacific fuel convoys across the Indian Ocean would require carrier strike groups—exactly the forces needed in the Pacific theater. The operational geometry becomes absurd: fighting China while diverting combat power to protect fuel supply lines thousands of miles away.

Historical Echo: Japan's Fatal Flaw

Imperial Japan attacked Pearl Harbor primarily because of U.S. oil embargoes. Despite capturing Dutch East Indies oil fields, Japan never solved the tanker problem—U.S. submarines devastated Japanese tanker fleets, strangling the war machine. By 1945, Japan had oil but couldn't transport it.

The U.S. faces an inverse problem: global oil exists, but infrastructure and transport capacity to deliver it to Pacific operations is inadequate. Like Japan, access to petroleum means little if you cannot reliably transport it across contested oceans.

Strategic Implications

This fuel crisis has profound consequences:

Operational Tempo Constraints: Fuel availability, not tactical considerations, may dictate operational tempo. The Navy may be unable to maintain continuous carrier presence simply because fuel cannot be delivered fast enough.

Allied Dependence: The U.S. becomes critically dependent on allied fuel infrastructure in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines—giving those nations de facto veto power over operations. If they deny access (politically or under Chinese pressure), operations cease.

Chinese Strategy: China doesn't need to sink carriers to neutralize them. Interdicting fuel supply—targeting oilers, attacking Guam storage, disrupting West Coast refineries through cyber attacks—accomplishes the same goal. The fuel logistics chain is far more vulnerable than the warships themselves.

Force Design Revolution Required: This argues for:

Distributed operations with lower fuel consumption
Shorter-range operations closer to secure fuel sources
Nuclear propulsion for all major combatants
Urgent diplomatic agreements to pre-position massive fuel stocks throughout the first island chain

No Good Solutions

The fuel crisis has no near-term solutions:

✗ Can't build new refineries (regulatory timeline: decades)
✗ Can't restore Red Hill (permanent closure, defueling complete)
✗ Can't rapidly expand oiler fleet (shipbuilding constraints)
✗ Can't rely on Persian Gulf (too distant, too vulnerable)
✗ Can't pre-position without storage facilities (and those within Chinese missile range)

The Existential Conclusion

You cannot fight a Pacific war without fuel. The United States has built sophisticated warships, developed hypersonic weapons, and improved ISR networks. But all of this becomes irrelevant if those ships cannot be fueled.

Admiral Paparo's "narrow margins" warning was understated. The margins may not exist at all. The closing of Red Hill and degradation of West Coast refining capacity may have inadvertently accomplished what Chinese military planners could only dream of: making sustained U.S. Pacific naval operations logistically impossible.

This deserves recognition as a strategic crisis of the first order. Without fuel, the most sophisticated carrier, the most advanced fighter, the most capable submarine—all become useless museum pieces. The U.S. may have designed a fleet for Pacific operations that literally cannot be fueled for sustained combat.

Every oiler built, every logistics ship procured, every advanced refueling technique developed means nothing if there is no fuel to load aboard those ships. This may be the single most important—and most neglected—vulnerability in U.S. Pacific strategy.

Mine Warfare: Essential Yet Neglected

The ComNavOps analysis correctly identifies mine warfare as critically important while simultaneously dismissing the very capabilities designed to address it. China's extensive mine inventory—estimates range from several hundred thousand to over a million weapons—poses severe threats to fleet operations, port access, and commercial shipping.

Defensive mine countermeasures capabilities have atrophied over decades of neglect. The Navy currently operates only eight aging Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships, built in the 1980s with wooden hulls to reduce magnetic signatures. These vessels are slow, lack meaningful self-defense systems, and cannot launch unmanned systems or helicopters.[^27]

The Littoral Combat Ship's Mine Countermeasures Mission Package, despite the LCS program's many problems, represents current U.S. Navy minehunting capability. The MCM package achieved Initial Operational Capability in March 2023 after extensive testing.[^28] The first operational MCM packages were embarked aboard USS Canberra (LCS-30) in April 2024 and USS Santa Barbara (LCS-32), which became the first ship to complete mine warfare training milestones with unmanned surface vessels in late 2024.[^29]

Both ships deployed in March 2025 from San Diego, with USS Tulsa (LCS-16) joining them for forward deployment to Bahrain, replacing the aging Avenger-class ships.[^30] Four additional LCS with MCM packages are planned for deployment to Sasebo, Japan in 2027.[^31] With these deployments, the Navy will commence divesting the remaining Avenger-class ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters.[^32]

The MCM package comprises an integrated suite of unmanned systems: the Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (CUSV) developed by Textron Systems, the AN/AQS-20C forward-looking and side-scan sonar, the Unmanned Influence Sweep System, and the MH-60S helicopter equipped with the AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System and AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System.[^33]

In February 2025, the Navy awarded multiple contracts strengthening MCM capabilities: $7.7 million to Bollinger Shipyards for MCM USV advanced materials, $18.3 million to Raytheon Technologies for five Minehunt Payload Delivery Systems, and $12.1 million to Textron Systems for the Minesweep Payload Delivery System.[^34] Captain Matthew Lehmann, LCS Mission Modules program manager, emphasized that these contracts ensure "modernized MCM equipment needed to conduct missions safely while keeping Sailors out of the minefield."[^35]

The wholesale dismissal of the LCS and its MCM capabilities in the ComNavOps analysis ignores operational reality. Vice Admiral Brendan McLane, commander of Naval Surface Forces, stated in May 2024: "I am tremendously excited for the long-term viability of LCS as our enduring mine warfare platform due to their modularity and the ability to quickly design, develop, and deploy new subsystems within the MCM mission package."[^36]

The Unmanned Question: Technology and Emerging Doctrine

The wholesale dismissal of unmanned systems in the ComNavOps analysis represents perhaps its most questionable conclusion. While current unmanned capabilities certainly have limitations, the trajectory of technological development and emerging operational concepts suggest these systems will play increasingly important roles.

The Navy's Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) and Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) programs have experienced significant programmatic turbulence but represent serious attempts to field distributed strike and ISR capabilities. The Navy's FY2025 budget requested $54.0 million in R&D funding for LUSV, $101.8 million for MUSV, and $92.9 million for LUSV/MUSV enabling capabilities.[^37]

Originally, the Navy planned distinct LUSV (up to 300 feet long, 2,000 tons displacement) and MUSV (under 200 feet, under 500 tons) designs. However, in April 2025, Navy officials indicated plans to merge both programs into a single program for autonomous surface craft, consolidating under the major capability acquisition pathway by fiscal year 2027.[^38] Rear Admiral Daryl Daly, overseeing unmanned systems, proposed at the January 2025 Surface Navy Association symposium a unified design around 200 feet capable of carrying up to four 40-foot payload containers, with estimated costs around $50 million per vessel versus earlier LUSV estimates of nearly $500 million.[^39]

The shift toward modular containerized payloads offers operational flexibility. The Navy has successfully tested the Mk 70 Expeditionary Launcher (Payload Delivery System) in containerized format, enabling deployment of Standard Missile-6 and Tomahawk cruise missiles from unmanned platforms. In 2021, the Navy and Strategic Capabilities Office successfully fired a Standard Missile-6 remotely from a modular launcher aboard USV Ranger.[^40]

By July 2025, the Navy issued a request for information on a family of unmanned vessels including the Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) baseline design carrying two 40-foot ISO containers with 2,500 nautical mile range at 25 knots, alongside specialized variants for different mission sets.[^41] In June 2025, the Navy established Unmanned Surface Vessel Squadron (USVRON) ONE with multiple detachments, formalizing command structures for unmanned vessel operations.^42

The MQ-25 Stingray unmanned tanker, scheduled for operational deployment in 2026, directly addresses carrier air wing range limitations by providing aerial refueling without consuming fighter-attack aircraft for tanking missions. This single capability multiplies effective carrier strike radius significantly.

For underwater operations, the Extra Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) program, exemplified by the Orca, provides persistent surveillance capabilities in contested waters where manned platforms face unacceptable risks. The Navy's FY2025 budget requested $21.5 million for XLUUV R&D and $68.2 million for core UUV technologies.[^43]

Force Structure Recommendations: A Realistic Assessment

So what should the Navy's force structure prioritize for Indo-Pacific operations? A realistic assessment incorporating recent wargaming, operational analysis, and technological developments suggests:

Submarines: The current plan for 66 attack submarines is insufficient; 80-85 boats would provide capacity for sustained operations including attrition reserves. SSGNs provide critical strike capacity. Converting additional Virginia-class submarines with the Virginia Payload Module helps but cannot fully replace the 616 Tomahawk tubes lost with Ohio SSGN retirement. Serious consideration should be given to purpose-built SSGNs or large-scale SSGN conversions.

Surface Combatants: A balanced mix of high-end destroyers (Burke Flight III and future DDG(X)), mid-tier frigates (Constellation-class), and potentially lower-end corvettes for convoy escort provides operational flexibility. Current planning for 60+ large surface combatants and 20 frigates is reasonable if production timelines can be maintained—a significant challenge given shipbuilding industrial base constraints.

Carriers: Recent wargaming demonstrates carriers remain essential but highly vulnerable. Operating patterns will likely shift to positions farther from Chinese strike ranges, requiring enhanced air wing range through tanking and next-generation fighters. The current plan for 11 carriers may prove financially unsustainable; 9-10 carriers supplemented by enhanced shore-based aviation and long-range strike capabilities might provide adequate capacity while controlling costs.

Aviation: Contrary to the ComNavOps analysis, the F-35C brings unprecedented sensor fusion, low observability, and electronic warfare capabilities enabling survival in contested airspace where legacy aircraft cannot operate. Its integration with the emerging F/A-XX long-range strike fighter and continued EA-18G electronic attack capability provides a balanced, capable air wing. The MQ-25 tanker multiplies effective reach.

Hypersonic Weapons: Accelerated CPS procurement and deployment is essential. The current plan for limited missile quantities through FY2029 is inadequate for high-intensity operations. Deep magazines across all weapon types—particularly hypersonics, anti-ship missiles, and strike weapons—are non-negotiable.

Mine Warfare: Continued investment in the LCS MCM package while developing next-generation capabilities including additional unmanned mine hunting platforms, air-dropped mining capacity, and submarine-launched weapons. The technology exists; what's needed is production at scale. Dozens of MCM platforms are required, not single digits.

Logistics: This is the most critical shortfall. Additional oilers, ammunition ships, dry cargo ships, and forward logistics infrastructure are essential. Hardening Guam facilities, developing alternative support sites throughout the first island chain, and expanding pre-positioned equipment throughout allied nations require sustained investment and diplomatic agreements.

Unmanned Systems: Rather than wholesale dismissal, the Navy should accelerate fielding of proven unmanned capabilities: MCM systems already deployed on LCS, aerial tanking with MQ-25, and distributed strike platforms using containerized payloads. Focus on mature, operationally relevant systems rather than exquisite developmental programs.

Advanced Base Support: The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept addresses real operational requirements for distributed forces throughout the island chains. Light amphibious warfare ships, though modest individually, enable the distributed logistics essential for sustained operations across vast Pacific distances.

The Procurement Reality

The gap between operational requirements and programmed force structure stems partly from funding constraints and partly from strategic confusion. The Navy's FY2024 shipbuilding budget request was approximately $32 billion—substantial in absolute terms but insufficient to simultaneously maintain existing forces, develop new platforms, and expand fleet size.[^44]

The Navy's 2024 Force Structure Assessment calls for significant fleet growth. Achieving this requires sustained annual shipbuilding investment at levels significantly above current funding—likely $35-40 billion annually over two decades. Political willingness to sustain this investment remains uncertain, particularly given competing budget priorities.

Conclusion: Strategic Choices and Hard Truths

The ComNavOps analysis usefully challenges conventional thinking about naval force structure but oversimplifies complex operational problems and dismisses emerging capabilities that address real warfare requirements. The author is correct that procurement priorities don't consistently align with combat needs, but the recommended force structure—heavy on guns, light on modern technology—reads more like World War II nostalgia than serious strategic analysis.

The reality of Indo-Pacific conflict, as demonstrated by rigorous CSIS wargaming, is that even victory comes at costs that would "damage the U.S. global position for many years." Distance, time, and logistics dominate all operations. No silver bullet exists. Success requires:

Sufficient mass: Numbers matter; the Navy needs more ships and more weapons than current planning provides
Technological edge: Maintaining qualitative superiority in sensors, weapons, and command-and-control partially compensates for numerical disadvantages
Distributed operations: Concentrating forces invites catastrophic losses; distributing capabilities complicates adversary targeting
Logistical depth: The ability to sustain operations across Pacific distances for months or years distinguishes raids from campaigns
Allied integration: No U.S. victory is possible without Japan, Australia, and potentially other regional partners contributing significant combat power

The force structure debate ultimately reflects deeper questions about American strategic priorities, risk tolerance, and willingness to invest in military capabilities. The Navy we need for Indo-Pacific conflict is larger, more capable, and more expensive than what we currently have or plan to build.

Whether the nation is willing to make the necessary investment—accepting the substantial costs of both building the fleet and accepting casualties in any actual conflict—remains the fundamental unresolved question. The fleet we need isn't the fleet we have, but neither is it the simplified force structure proposed in the ComNavOps analysis. It's a larger, more technologically advanced, more distributed force with robust logistics support and deep munitions stockpiles—expensive, complex, and essential for deterring or, if necessary, fighting and winning against a peer competitor in the world's most strategically vital region.

You raise an absolutely critical point that fundamentally changes the calculus of this entire discussion. Let me add a concluding section that addresses this stark reality:

The Harsh Reality: Industrial Capacity and Budget Constraints

The analysis above describes what the Navy needs for Indo-Pacific conflict. However, recent developments suggest the service is heading in precisely the opposite direction—not by choice, but driven by industrial base collapse and budgetary constraints that may be insurmountable.

The Premature Divestment Crisis

In a series of stunning decisions, the Navy has announced plans that effectively reduce, rather than expand, combat capacity:

Carrier Force Reduction: The Navy is considering early retirement of USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and potentially other Nimitz-class carriers before their 50-year service lives expire. With the Ford-class program experiencing persistent delays and cost overruns (USS Enterprise CVN-80 and subsequent hulls), this creates a force structure valley where the carrier fleet could drop below nine ships—precisely when CSIS wargaming suggests we need every available deck.

Littoral Combat Ship Debacle: After spending billions developing the LCS and its mission packages, the Navy is divesting both Freedom and Independence-class ships that have barely reached mid-life. While the LCS has well-documented problems, the MCM mission package finally works and is operationally deployed. Retiring these platforms eliminates the Navy's primary mine warfare capability just as it's becoming operational.

Constellation-Class Slowdown: The FFG-62 Constellation-class frigate program, intended to provide 20+ mid-tier combatants, faces persistent delays and may see procurement rates slashed. With only two hulls funded through FY2024 and significant cost growth, the program that should provide distributed surface combatants is foundering.

Amphibious Force Hollowing: The amphibious fleet continues shrinking below the Marine Corps' stated requirement of 31 ships, undermining any serious capability for expeditionary advanced base operations throughout the first island chain.

Industrial Base Collapse

The uncomfortable truth is that America's shipbuilding industrial base has deteriorated to a point where it cannot support the fleet we need, regardless of funding:

Shipyard Capacity: China operates the world's largest shipbuilding industry with approximately 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States. Chinese shipyards launched more naval tonnage in the past decade than the entire French Navy. Meanwhile, U.S. shipyards struggle to maintain existing ships, much less expand the fleet.

Workforce Crisis: Skilled shipbuilding workforce shortages plague every major U.S. naval shipyard. Training new workers takes years, and the pipeline cannot rapidly expand. Current submarine construction delays of 12-36 months per boat demonstrate the scope of this problem.

Supply Chain Fragmentation: Critical components for naval vessels—from specialized steel to electronics—face supply chain constraints. The defense industrial base has consolidated and atrophied over decades of reduced procurement.

Repair and Maintenance Backlog: Ships can't deploy if they can't be maintained. Public and private shipyards are overwhelmed with repair backlogs, forcing the Navy to increasingly rely on allied shipyards in Japan, South Korea, and Australia for maintenance work—creating potential vulnerabilities during conflict.

The Budget Reality

Even if industrial capacity existed, budget constraints impose hard limits:

Shipbuilding Accounts: The Navy's FY2024 shipbuilding request of approximately $32 billion is insufficient to simultaneously maintain, modernize, and expand the fleet. Achieving the 381-ship goal by 2045 would require sustained investments of $35-40 billion annually for two decades—a 10-25% increase that seems politically impossible.

Operations and Maintenance Squeeze: Each ship procured incurs 30-40 years of operating costs. The Navy already faces an O&M crisis, with insufficient funds to operate existing ships at required tempos. Adding ships without proportional O&M increases creates "hollow fleet" scenarios where ships exist but cannot sail.

Entitlement Spending Pressure: Mandatory federal spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid consumes increasing portions of the federal budget, squeezing discretionary spending including defense. Absent fundamental entitlement reform or massive tax increases, sustained shipbuilding expansion appears financially untenable.

The Forced March to Unmanned Systems

Given these constraints, the Navy may have no choice but to pursue the strategy you identify: radical dependence on cheaper unmanned platforms. This isn't the optimal solution—it's the only solution compatible with industrial and fiscal reality.

Cost Differential: A Burke-class destroyer costs approximately $2 billion. A Ford-class carrier costs $13 billion. By contrast, Rear Admiral Daly's proposed unified USV design targets $50 million per hull—1/40th the cost of a destroyer, 1/260th the cost of a carrier. Even accounting for payload costs, a missile-equipped USV might cost $100-150 million—still a 10-20x cost advantage.

Production Scalability: Commercial shipyards throughout the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and allied nations can build 200-foot unmanned vessels far more readily than constructing specialized warships. The modular containerized payload approach enables distributed production across multiple yards, avoiding bottlenecks at naval shipbuilding facilities.

Acceptable Attrition: CSIS wargaming shows dozens of ships lost in Taiwan scenarios. Losing a $100 million unmanned vessel carrying 32 missiles is painful but acceptable. Losing a $2 billion Aegis destroyer with 96 missiles and 300 crew is catastrophic. Unmanned platforms align with acceptable loss rates in high-intensity conflict.

Rapid Recapitalization: Commercial shipbuilding can produce hulls in 12-18 months versus 5-7 years for complex warships. After suffering losses, the U.S. could potentially rebuild unmanned capacity far faster than replacing sophisticated manned combatants.

The Conceptual Challenge

This forced march to unmanned systems requires fundamental reconceptualization of naval warfare:

Magazine Distribution: Rather than concentrating 96 VLS cells on expensive Burkes, distribute missiles across ten unmanned vessels with 10-16 cells each. This complicates enemy targeting—destroying one platform eliminates only 10% of magazines rather than 100%. Chinese targeting problems multiply exponentially with platform proliferation.

Sensor Networks: Unmanned platforms carrying ISR payloads create persistent sensor networks throughout the first island chain. Rather than episodic carrier aircraft sorties, maintain continuous surveillance from distributed, expendable platforms.

Logistics Transformation: LUSV-scale platforms could serve as autonomous logistics shuttles, moving fuel, ammunition, and supplies between protected rear areas and forward forces with minimal crew exposure. This addresses Admiral Paparo's Combat Logistics Force crisis through platform multiplication rather than exquisite ship procurement.

Manned/Unmanned Teaming: The hybrid fleet concept—manned combatants providing command/control while unmanned vessels serve as distributed magazines, sensors, and expendable first-wave assets—may be the only operationally viable and financially achievable force structure.

The Risk Calculus

This unmanned-centric approach carries profound risks:

Technological Immaturity: Despite progress, autonomous systems remain immature. Communications links can be jammed. Software fails. The Navy has not operationally proven that unmanned platforms can execute complex tactical maneuvers in contested electromagnetic environments.

Operational Concepts Undefined: How exactly does one fight with 50+ unmanned vessels distributed across thousands of miles? Command and control architectures, communications networks, and tactical doctrine remain theoretical. We're fielding platforms without proven concepts of operation.

Cyber Vulnerabilities: Every unmanned platform represents a potential cyber attack vector. Chinese cyber capabilities are formidable. Compromising autonomous systems could turn U.S. weapons against American forces—a nightmare scenario with no good solutions.

Maintenance and Sustainment: Who maintains these unmanned vessels? Where? Current plans remain vague on support infrastructure, crew requirements (even "unmanned" vessels need some maintenance personnel), and logistics chains for geographically distributed platforms.

The Unavoidable Conclusion

You're right. The Navy is heading in the opposite direction from what analysis suggests is needed—not because of strategic incoherence, but because industrial and fiscal reality permits no alternative. The United States cannot build enough sophisticated warships to match Chinese numerical advantages. We cannot afford the fleet identified in wargaming as necessary for Taiwan defense. The shipyards don't exist, the workforce isn't there, and the money won't be appropriated.

The forced march to unmanned systems isn't a choice—it's an admission that traditional naval shipbuilding cannot meet requirements within existing constraints. Whether this represents innovative adaptation or dangerous improvisation depends on execution. The Navy must:

Accept reality: Stop pretending we'll build 381 manned ships. Design force structure around what's actually achievable.
Accelerate unmanned fielding: Move beyond prototypes to production. Accept that systems won't be perfect—"good enough, fielded now" beats "perfect, arriving never."
Develop operational concepts: Stop building platforms without doctrine. Extensive wargaming, experimentation, and realistic testing must precede large-scale procurement.
Address vulnerabilities systematically: Cyber hardening, electromagnetic resilience, and autonomous system reliability aren't optional—they're existential requirements.
Industrial base investment: While we can't rebuild the naval shipbuilding industrial base overnight, investing in commercial shipyards, workforce training, and supply chain resilience enables scaling unmanned production.

The uncomfortable truth is that America may be forced to discover whether distributed unmanned systems can substitute for traditional naval power not through careful analysis, but through necessity born of industrial decline and fiscal constraint. If conflict comes before this question is answered, we'll learn the answer in the most costly way possible.

The fleet we need is unaffordable and unbuildable. The fleet we can afford and build is untested and uncertain. That gap between requirement and capability represents the central strategic challenge facing American naval power in the Indo-Pacific—and there are no easy answers.

The Historical Mirror: America as Imperial Japan

The strategic parallel is almost too stark to ignore: the United States in the 2020s faces the same logistical vice that destroyed Imperial Japan in the 1940s—and the situation may actually be worse because we've had 80 years to learn from Japan's mistakes yet somehow replicated them anyway.

Japan's Fatal Dependency

Imperial Japan's entire war strategy revolved around petroleum:

The Trigger: U.S. oil embargo (July 1941) cut off 80% of Japan's oil imports
The Solution Attempted: Seize Dutch East Indies oil fields to secure supply
The Fatal Flaw: Couldn't protect tanker routes from oil fields to Japanese industry
The Result: U.S. submarine campaign destroyed Japanese tanker fleet

By 1945, Japan controlled oil fields producing millions of barrels but couldn't transport it. Japanese warships sat in ports, aircraft couldn't fly, and tanks couldn't move—not for lack of petroleum at the source, but for lack of tankers to transport it across contested waters. The Imperial Japanese Navy had oil in Sumatra but no fuel in Yokosuka.

America's Parallel Trap

Now examine the U.S. position:

The Resource: Abundant global oil supplies (Persian Gulf, Alaska, Canada, West Coast)
The Distance: 5,000-8,000 nautical miles from sources to Western Pacific
The Vulnerability: Slow-moving tankers/oilers traversing contested waters
The Threat: Chinese submarines, anti-ship missiles, and air power rather than U.S. submarines

The U.S. Navy could face the same fate as the Imperial Japanese Navy: plenty of petroleum exists somewhere, but it cannot be reliably delivered to where the fleet operates.

The Submarines Are On the Other Side Now

Japan's tanker crisis resulted from American submarine warfare:

USS Wahoo, Flasher, Tang, and hundreds of others systematically destroyed Japanese maritime logistics
Japanese anti-submarine warfare proved inadequate despite knowing the threat
Convoy escorts couldn't protect slow-moving tankers across thousands of miles
By 1945, Japanese tanker fleet was essentially annihilated

Now consider the Pacific in 2025-2030:

China operates 60+ submarines, increasingly capable and quiet
Chinese diesel-electric boats operating in home waters have acoustic advantages
American oilers transit 6,000-8,000 nautical miles across Pacific—perfect submarine targets
U.S. anti-submarine warfare assets would be stretched protecting carrier groups; oiler convoys would receive minimal escort
Each oiler sunk doesn't just remove fuel—it removes irreplaceable transport capacity from a tiny fleet of 15-20 vessels

If China sinks 3-5 oilers in the first weeks of conflict, U.S. Pacific operations become unsustainable regardless of how many carriers or destroyers remain operational.

The Differences That Make It Worse

At least Japan in 1941-45 had some advantages the U.S. now lacks:

Japan's Advantages (That the U.S. Doesn't Have):

Captured oil fields within 2,000 miles of Japan (relatively short supply lines)
Large merchant marine and tanker fleet to nationalize
Domestic shipbuilding capacity to replace losses (though insufficient)
Interior lines of communication through controlled seas
Limited alternative energy requirements (smaller air force, less mechanized ground forces)

U.S. Disadvantages (That Japan Didn't Face):

Fuel sources 6,000-8,000 miles from operations (3-4x Japan's distance)
Tiny oiler fleet (15-20 ships) with no surge capacity
No domestic tanker fleet to requisition (most are foreign-flagged)
No shipbuilding capacity to replace losses quickly
Extended supply lines through contested waters from day one
Much higher fuel consumption requirements (nuclear carriers, intensive air operations, extensive amphibious ops)

Japan could at least theoretically build more tankers. The U.S. cannot—the shipyards don't exist, the workforce doesn't exist, and the timeline (3-5 years minimum) is irrelevant for active conflict.

Strategic Implications of the Role Reversal

This role reversal has profound implications:

China as Submarine Power: China doesn't need to match the U.S. Navy ship-for-ship. Like America in 1941-45, China can focus submarine warfare on vulnerable logistics. Sinking oilers is easier than sinking carriers, requires less sophisticated weapons, and creates disproportionate strategic impact.

Interior Lines Advantage: China operates on interior lines with shore-based support. The U.S. operates at the end of 6,000-mile supply chains. This is the exact geometry that doomed Japan—reversed.

No Relief Force Coming: Japan hoped (unrealistically) that decisive battle victory might force U.S. accommodation. At least theoretically, Japan could envision an operational solution. The U.S. has no such hope—there's no third party who will interdict Chinese submarines to protect American logistics. The U.S. must solve its own logistics security problem, and the forces required would come from the same pool needed for Taiwan operations.

Attrition Spiral: Every oiler sunk makes remaining oilers more precious and more heavily escorted, consuming more assets. This creates a death spiral where protecting logistics consumes the combat power needed for primary missions. Japan experienced exactly this—convoy escort demands eventually consumed most of the Imperial Navy.

The Unlearned Lessons

The most damning aspect: the United States had eight decades to study Japan's logistical collapse and apparently learned nothing:

Lesson Japan Taught: Don't depend on vulnerable maritime logistics across contested waters for essential war materials.

What the U.S. Did:

Closed Red Hill (Hawaii fuel storage)
Allowed West Coast refineries to shutter
Failed to develop forward fuel infrastructure
Created dependence on vulnerable 6,000+ mile maritime supply lines
Built sophisticated warships without ensuring they could be fueled

Japan at least had the excuse of being an island nation with no domestic oil. The United States has domestic oil but dismantled the refining and storage infrastructure needed to use it.

Why This Happened: The Peacetime Illusion

The root cause: decisions made sense in peacetime that prove catastrophic in war.

Red Hill: Closed for environmental protection (valid peacetime concern). Nobody asked "How do we fuel the Pacific Fleet in wartime without this?"

Refinery Closures: Made economic sense for companies, supported by environmental regulations. Nobody asked "Where will military fuel come from if West Coast refining capacity drops 40%?"

Alaska Development: Too expensive and environmentally controversial. Nobody asked "Shouldn't we have secure fuel sources near potential conflict zones?"

Each decision was defensible in isolation. Collectively, they created strategic disaster. This mirrors how Japan's pre-war decisions (focusing on battleships over tankers, inadequate convoy doctrine, poor ASW development) made sense individually but collectively ensured defeat.

The Unsolvable Problem

Japan in 1943 recognized its tanker crisis but couldn't solve it:

Shipbuilding capacity was insufficient
Convoy escorts were inadequate
ASW technology lagged American capabilities
The supply lines were too long and too exposed

The U.S. in 2025 faces the same unsolvable problem:

Can't rapidly build new refineries (10-15 year timeline)
Can't rapidly build new oilers (3-5 year timeline with limited yards)
Can't secure 6,000-mile supply lines with available forces
Can't pre-position fuel without storage facilities that don't exist
Can't rely on alternative sources (all have fatal flaws)

Japan tried to solve an unsolvable problem for three years and failed. The U.S. doesn't even have three years—the problem exists now, and conflict could come at any time.

The Scenario That Keeps Admirals Awake

Imagine this scenario, which closely parallels Japan's experience:

Week 1: China invades Taiwan. U.S. carriers operate east of Taiwan. Initial fuel stocks sufficient.

Week 2: Two carrier groups refuel from oilers. Chinese submarine sinks one oiler returning to Pearl Harbor—800,000+ gallons of fuel and irreplaceable transport capacity lost. Navy reroutes oilers on longer, "safer" routes.

Week 3: Chinese submarine sinks second oiler en route. Another oiler suffers mechanical breakdown (these are old ships). Carrier operations continue but fuel anxiety begins. Oilers now require escort, consuming destroyers needed for other missions.

Week 4: Remaining oilers stretched thin between multiple carrier groups. Chinese submarines sink third oiler. Now doing math: remaining oilers, transit times, consumption rates. Numbers don't work. Begin reducing operational tempo to conserve fuel.

Week 5: One carrier group must withdraw to Japan to refuel—no oilers available. Air operations decrease. Chinese recognize logistics crisis and intensify submarine operations against oilers.

Week 6: Fourth oiler sunk. Fifth suffers damage from near-miss. Fleet operations unsustainable. Begin withdrawing carrier groups to Hawaii despite ongoing Taiwan battle. Not because carriers are sunk or damaged—because they cannot be fueled.

Result: Operational defeat caused by logistics failure, not combat losses. Exactly how Japan lost.

The Question With No Good Answer

Japan in 1941 faced an impossible choice:

Accept U.S. oil embargo and economic strangulation
Go to war knowing tanker vulnerability could prove fatal

Japan chose war, hoping for decisive victory before logistics collapsed. It didn't work.

The U.S. in 2025 faces a comparable dilemma:

Accept that sustained Pacific operations may be logistically impossible
Attempt operations knowing fuel logistics could prove fatal

At least Japan made an active choice. The U.S. stumbled into this position through decades of infrastructure neglect, never consciously choosing between acceptable alternatives.

The Only Real Solution

There's only one way to escape this trap, and it's not a near-term option:

10-Year Reconstruction Program:

Build 3-4 modern refineries in Alaska and/or Pacific Northwest ($15-20 billion)
Construct multiple Red Hill-equivalent fuel storage facilities in hardened, distributed locations throughout the Pacific ($10-15 billion)
Build 20-30 additional oilers and create surge shipbuilding capacity ($20-30 billion)
Develop undersea fuel pipelines or alternative fuel distribution methods
Convert major combatants to nuclear power where practical
Create forward fuel caching with allied nations (political agreements + infrastructure)

Total cost: $50-70 billion. Timeline: 10-15 years. Political will required: Substantial and sustained.

This isn't happening. There's no political constituency for unglamorous petroleum infrastructure. Congress would rather fund exciting new weapons systems than rebuilding fuel supply chains. By the time crisis emerges, it will be far too late.

The Final Irony

The cruelest irony: the United States Navy studied Japanese logistics failures extensively. Every naval officer knows the story of Japan's tanker crisis. It's taught at the Naval War College. It's discussed in strategy courses. It's analyzed in professional journals.

And then the U.S. Navy designed a fleet that recreates Japan's exact logistical vulnerability.

We knew the lesson. We taught the lesson. We ignored the lesson.

Japan had the excuse of being a resource-poor island nation with limited strategic options. The United States has no such excuse. This is a self-inflicted wound, created by decades of institutional failure to connect strategic requirements with infrastructure reality.

The nightmare scenario: Chinese military historians in 2035 studying how the U.S. Navy in 2025-2030 recreated Imperial Japan's fatal logistics failure, only worse, despite having every historical warning and decades to prepare otherwise.

Conclusion: The Vice Tightens

The U.S. is in the logistical vice faced by Japan in World War II, and there is no apparent solution in relevant timeframes.

Can't rapidly fix refining capacity
Can't rebuild Red Hill or equivalents
Can't secure supply lines with available forces
Can't rely on alternative petroleum sources
Can't build out of the problem quickly enough

Every path examined leads to the same conclusion: sustained high-intensity Pacific naval operations may be logistically impossible regardless of how many ships, aircraft, or weapons the U.S. possesses.

This represents a failure of strategic imagination so profound that future historians may struggle to understand how the United States, with all its resources and all its historical knowledge, allowed itself to replicate the exact logistical trap that destroyed Imperial Japan—except the U.S. version is worse because we had 80 years of warning and did it anyway.

The fuel crisis isn't a problem to be solved. It's a reality to be acknowledged. And that acknowledgment fundamentally changes every assumption about U.S. Pacific strategy, force structure, and operational planning. The emperor has no clothes, and the fleet has no fuel.

References

[^1]: Congressional Research Service, "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress," RL33153, August 16, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/08/20/report-to-congress-on-china-naval-modernization-2

[^2]: Alex Luck, "Chinese Naval Developments in 2024 - Part 1: Major Programs," Naval News, January 2, 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/chinese-naval-developments-2024-in-review-part-1-major-programs/

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[^13]: Cancian et al., "The First Battle of the Next War"

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[^36]: "Navy Admiral Selects Three Littoral Combat Ships for 2025 Basing with 5th Fleet"

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[^43]: "Report to Congress on Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles"

[^44]: Congressional Research Service, "China Naval Modernization"

Stephen Spender is a Senior Engineer Scientist with over 20 years of specialized expertise in radar systems engineering, signal processing, and aerospace defense applications, including work on Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) systems. He holds an MS in Electrical Engineering from MIT and a BS from University of Maryland.