Navy's Unmanned Revolution: America's Last Hope Against China's Naval Juggernaut

Navy Taps Project Overmatch Chief to Lead New Drone Effort in Acquisition Shakeup - USNI News

BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front)

The U.S. Navy faces an existential crisis as China's People's Liberation Army Navy surges to 370+ ships compared to America's declining 296-vessel fleet. With traditional shipbuilding plagued by decades of delays and cost overruns, the Navy's new Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Robotics and Autonomous Systems represents a desperate pivot to unmanned platforms as the only viable path to counter Beijing's overwhelming numerical superiority before a potential Taiwan invasion. Success requires radical acceleration of the "Replicator" initiative, integration with Project Overmatch battle networks, and procurement reforms that Pentagon bureaucracy has consistently failed to deliver.

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**WASHINGTON—**The U.S. Navy stands at a crossroads that will determine America's ability to defend freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific for generations to come. While China's shipyards churn out modern warships at an unprecedented pace, America's traditional shipbuilding has devolved into a morass of delays, budget overruns, and broken promises.

The appointment of Rebecca Gassler as the first Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Robotics and Autonomous Systems on December 17, 2025, signals the Navy's belated recognition that unmanned platforms may be its last, best hope to avoid strategic irrelevance in the Western Pacific.

The Numbers Tell a Stark Story

The disparity between American and Chinese naval forces has reached alarming proportions. According to the Congressional Research Service's April 2025 report on Chinese naval modernization, the People's Liberation Army Navy operates more than 370 battle force ships and is projected to reach 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030.[1]

In stark contrast, the U.S. Navy included just 296 battle force ships as of January 2025, with projections showing a decline to 294 ships by the end of fiscal year 2030.[2] More troubling still, the Navy has not increased its fleet size over the past 20 years despite nearly doubling its shipbuilding budget, according to Government Accountability Office testimony in March 2025.[3]

"China has a domestic shipbuilding capacity 232 times greater than the United States," according to leaked U.S. Navy briefings cited by multiple defense analysts.[4] This industrial asymmetry represents perhaps the most fundamental challenge to American sea power since World War II.

The Shipbuilding Debacle

The Navy's traditional approach to fleet expansion has collapsed under the weight of acquisition dysfunction. GAO reports document a decades-long pattern of cost growth, delivery delays, and underperforming ships.[5]

The Constellation-class frigate program exemplifies the problem. Construction began before completing ship design—counter to leading practices—and delivery is now expected at least three years late.[6] The program was abruptly curtailed in November 2025 amid mounting delays across American naval shipyards.[7]

Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines face delays of at least one year and hundreds of millions in additional costs.[8] Virginia-class attack submarines are similarly behind schedule. As of December 2025, 37 of the 45 battle force ships under construction face delays.[9]

"The Navy hasn't increased the number of ships in its fleet over the past 20 years—despite nearly doubling its shipbuilding budget," GAO Director Shelby Oakley told Congress.[10] "Its acquisition practices consistently result in growing costs and delivery delays."

This acquisition paralysis occurs against the backdrop of China's relentless naval expansion. The PLAN has fielded 4,300 vertical launch system cells on its surface combatants over two decades and operates increasingly sophisticated Type 052D destroyers and Type 055 cruisers equipped with advanced air defense and anti-ship systems.[11]

Enter the Unmanned Solution

The creation of the Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Robotics and Autonomous Systems consolidates nearly 50 unmanned programs across the Navy and Marine Corps under unified leadership reporting directly to the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition.[12]

According to documents reviewed by USNI News, the PAE RAS office will eventually oversee up to 66 programs across six Program Management Offices, managing approximately $19 billion in acquisitions over five years.[13]

Major programs include:

• Orca Extra Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV): Large displacement unmanned submarines for covert operations in contested waters
• Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC): Expendable surface platforms receiving $2.1 billion from the Reconciliation Act[14]
• Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG): Born from the Replicator Initiative with $1.53 billion for small unmanned surface vessels[15]

The Navy's fiscal 2026 budget allocated an unprecedented $5.3 billion to autonomy programs—a $2.2 billion increase over the previous year, representing the largest investment across any military domain.[16]

The Taiwan Imperative: Operation "Hellscape"

The urgency driving unmanned systems development stems from a specific operational problem: defending Taiwan against Chinese invasion in the 2027 timeframe that President Xi Jinping has designated for PLA readiness.

Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, unveiled the "Hellscape" strategy in June 2024, declaring: "I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities so I can make their lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything."[17]

The strategy envisions thousands of unmanned surface vessels, underwater vehicles, and aerial drones swarming Chinese invasion forces as they cross the 100-nautical-mile Taiwan Strait, creating chaos and attrition while U.S. and allied forces mobilize for full-scale response.[18]

Navy officials confirmed in January 2025 that the first iteration of the Replicator initiative remains on track for its August 2025 fielding deadline. "It's not another science and technology project," said Captain Alex Campbell, maritime portfolio director of the Defense Innovation Unit. "It is meant to get to production, meant to field systems, in this case, in support of Indo-Pacific Command."[19]

However, the scale required raises sobering questions. Ukrainian forces reportedly expend approximately 10,000 drones monthly across their 600-mile front line.[20] Taiwan's recent purchase of 1,000 Switchblade and Altius drones from the United States would provide only four to five volleys of that intensity—insufficient for sustained operations beyond a few days.[21]

The Replicator Reality Check

Despite official optimism, the Pentagon's ambitious Replicator program has encountered significant obstacles. While originally intended to field "multiple thousands" of autonomous systems by summer 2025, Congressional Research Service reporting indicates only "hundreds" had materialized by the August 2025 target date.[22]

Technical challenges plague the initiative. Multiple drone systems selected for Replicator failed during testing phases—a BlackSea Technologies unmanned boat went adrift due to steering failure, while an Anduril Industries drone launch was delayed by technical problems, according to September 2025 Wall Street Journal reporting.[23]

The program faces three critical shortfalls:

Interoperability: Crucial software needed to command large numbers of different drones simultaneously remains incomplete. The Defense Innovation Unit awarded contracts in November 2024 for Autonomous Collaborative Teaming (ACT) and Opportunistic Resilient Innovative Expeditionary Network Topology (ORIENT) software, but integration challenges persist.[24]

Cost Inflation: Originally conceived as fielding attritable, inexpensive systems, cost growth has undermined the "quantity over quality" approach. The Switchblade 600 drone costs approximately $100,000 per unit—vastly more than Ukrainian equivalents produced for as little as $300.[25]

Industrial Base: Of approximately a dozen systems considered for Replicator, three were still in development phases when selected, highlighting pressure to move from concept to deployment without adequate testing.[26]

The program was transferred to the newly created Defense Autonomous Warfare Group in late 2025 in an attempt to accelerate progress, though questions remain about its ultimate scope and effectiveness.[27]

Project Overmatch: The Network Foundation

Rebecca Gassler's background leading Project Overmatch—the Navy's highly classified contribution to Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)—is central to understanding the service's unmanned strategy.

Project Overmatch seeks to create what Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday calls "a network of networks" that allows any data to transfer over any network through software-defined communications.[28] The system aims to flow targeting information seamlessly across the fleet, enabling faster decision-making and coordinated fires.

The Navy requested $192 million for Project Overmatch in fiscal 2024, with the technology deployed to carrier strike groups beginning in 2023.[29] Testing during Large Scale Exercise 23 in August 2023 involved nine maritime operations centers, six carrier strike groups, and 25,000 sailors and Marines.[30]

"Our concept of 'done' has to change," explained Rear Admiral Douglas Small, who leads both Naval Information Warfare Systems Command and Project Overmatch. "This has got to move so fast that the adversary cannot get back up off the mat. Maybe they have mass on us, but we have quality of data, quality of capability."[31]

Project Overmatch represents the essential nervous system that will allow thousands of distributed unmanned platforms to function as a cohesive fighting force rather than disconnected individual systems.

What Must Be Done: A Path Forward

Accelerating operational deployment and integration of unmanned platforms requires systemic reforms across acquisition, doctrine, and industrial policy:

1. Adopt Commercial Acquisition Models

The Navy must embrace Other Transaction Authorities and rapid prototyping cycles. Recent contracts demonstrate what's possible: Navy officials stated that autonomous surface vessel contracts using OTAs will move from prototype to production in less than 12 months—"a massive departure from traditional defense acquisition cycles that can stretch across years."[32]

2. Prioritize Payload and Sensor Integration

Unmanned platforms are only as valuable as the sensors and weapons they carry. The PAE RAS office explicitly includes "Sensor and Payloads" as one of six planned Program Management Offices.[33] Investment in modular payloads—ISR suites, electronic warfare systems, strike weapons—must parallel platform procurement.

For a Taiwan contingency, this means integrating:

• Multi-mode SAR/GMTI radars for wide-area maritime surveillance
• Electronic support measures for signals intelligence
• Collaborative targeting networks allowing sensor data from one platform to cue weapons on another
• Anti-ship and land-attack munitions compatible with expeditionary logistics

3. Build Sovereign Manufacturing Capacity

China's 232-to-1 shipbuilding advantage cannot be overcome through traditional approaches. The Navy must leverage commercial shipyards and establish production facilities optimized for high-volume unmanned system manufacturing.

The One Big Beautiful Bill Act appropriated $450 million and $145 million to unmanned surface/underwater vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles respectively—modest compared to $29 billion for traditional shipbuilding.[34] This allocation must be reversed to reflect strategic priorities.

4. Develop Resilient Command and Control

Software development for swarm coordination—the ACT and ORIENT programs—deserves accelerated funding and priority testing. These capabilities must function in communications and GNSS-denied environments where Chinese jamming and cyber attacks will be pervasive.[35]

5. Establish Doctrine and Training

The Navy has stood up Unmanned Surface Vessel Squadron 3, the "Hell Hounds," which recently received its first four Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Crafts.[36] Additional squadrons must be activated, and integration with manned forces exercised repeatedly.

6. International Collaboration

Project Overmatch is reportedly sharing capabilities with Australia, France, and the United Kingdom.[37] AUKUS Pillar 2 explicitly addresses collaborative autonomous systems development. Expanding this cooperation to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would multiply deterrent effects.

The Stakes Could Not Be Higher

Former Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks, architect of the Replicator initiative, framed the challenge starkly in August 2023: "We'll counter the PLA's mass with mass of our own, but ours will be harder to plan for, harder to hit and harder to beat."[38]

Bryan Clark, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, emphasizes the urgency: "Of all the services, the Navy's done the best job of trying to really focus their effort on what the operational commander needs, rather than things that the service thinks are cool to put together."[39]

Yet optimism must be tempered by realism. Center for Strategic and International Studies simulations of a 2026 Taiwan invasion scenario project devastating losses: The United States and Japan would lose 449 aircraft, 43 ships including two aircraft carriers, and nearly 7,000 personnel.[40]

The creation of PAE RAS under Gassler's leadership represents institutional acknowledgment that decades of acquisition dysfunction have left America with no choice but to bet heavily on unmanned systems. The alternative—conceding the Western Pacific to Chinese hegemony—is unacceptable.

Whether this reorganization proves too little, too late depends on execution speed, Congressional funding, and the Navy's willingness to subordinate traditional procurement preferences to operational necessity. The clock ticks toward 2027.

The question is no longer whether unmanned platforms will play a central role in deterring Chinese aggression—that debate has been settled. The question is whether the United States can field them in time and at scale sufficient to make Admiral Paparo's "hellscape" strategy credible rather than aspirational.

America's position as the world's preeminent naval power hangs in the balance.

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Verified Sources and Formal Citations

[1] U.S. Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, RL33153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 24, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33153

[2] U.S. Congressional Research Service, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, RL32665 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 7, 2025), https://news.usni.org/2025/02/07/report-to-congress-on-navy-force-structure-shipbuilding-plan

[3] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding: Enduring Challenges Call for Systemic Change, GAO-25-108225 (Washington, DC: March 25, 2025), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-108225

[4] "China's PLA Navy: A Peer Competitor Emerges," Geopolitical Monitor, October 10, 2025, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/backgrounder-chinas-pla-navy-comes-of-age/

[5] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding: A Generational Imperative for Systemic Change, GAO-25-108136 (Washington, DC: March 11, 2025), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-108136

[6] GAO-25-108225, Navy Shipbuilding: Enduring Challenges

[7] "The Future of the US Surface Fleet," The Australian Naval Institute, December 2025, https://navalinstitute.com.au/the-future-of-the-us-surface-fleet/

[8] GAO-25-108136, Navy Shipbuilding: A Generational Imperative

[9] "The Future of the US Surface Fleet," The Australian Naval Institute

[10] GAO-25-108225, Navy Shipbuilding: Enduring Challenges

[11] "How is China Modernizing its Navy?" ChinaPower Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 9, 2023, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-naval-modernization/

[12] Mallory Shelbourne, "Navy Taps Project Overmatch Chief to Lead New Drone Effort in Acquisition Shakeup," USNI News, December 18, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/12/18/navy-taps-project-overmatch-chief-to-lead-new-drone-effort-in-acquisition-shakeup

[13] Sam LaGrone, "New Navy Unmanned Acquisition Office Could Oversee up to 66 Programs, Consolidate 6 PEOs," USNI News, November 18, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/11/18/new-navy-unmanned-aqusition-office-could-oversee-up-to-66-programs-consolidate-6-peos

[14] LaGrone, "New Navy Unmanned Acquisition Office"

[15] LaGrone, "New Navy Unmanned Acquisition Office"

[16] "U.S. Prioritizes Navy Autonomy with $5.3 Billion Boost for Unmanned Maritime Systems Amid Growing Sea Threats," Army Recognition, June 26, 2025, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/u-s-prioritizes-navy-autonomy-with-5-3-billion-boost-for-unmanned-maritime-systems-amid-growing-sea-threats

[17] Kathrin Hille, "US Plans to Turn Taiwan Strait into 'Unmanned Hellscape' if China Invades," South China Morning Post, June 18, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3266092/us-plans-turn-taiwan-strait-unmanned-hellscape-if-china-invades-top-admiral

[18] John Grady, "'Hellscape' Swarms Could Be a Cost-Effective Taiwan Defense, Says Report," USNI News, July 2, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/07/01/hellscape-swarms-could-be-as-cost-effective-taiwan-defense-says-report

[19] Minnie Chan, "US Navy Confirms Drone 'Hellscape' for Use Against PLA in Taiwan Strait is on Track," South China Morning Post, January 30, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3296808/us-navy-confirms-drone-hellscape-use-against-pla-taiwan-strait-track

[20] Lt. Col. Thomas Galvin and Maj. John Spencer, "Envisioning a Hellscape: Ukrainian Lessons for a Taiwan Drone Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 151/4/1,466 (April 2025), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/april/envisioning-hellscape-ukrainian-lessons-taiwan-drone-strategy

[21] Galvin and Spencer, "Envisioning a Hellscape"

[22] Ben Wolfgang and John T. Seward, "Behind Replicator's Drone Delays: A Blueprint to Fix Pentagon Buying," The Washington Times, November 13, 2025, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/nov/13/happened-pentagons-replicator-program/

[23] Haye Kesteloo, "Pentagon's AI Drone Program Faces Major Setbacks, Gets Organizational Overhaul," DroneXL, September 28, 2025, https://dronexl.co/2025/09/28/pentagon-ai-drone-program-faces-major-setbacks/

[24] Ashley Roque, "Pentagon Picks Programmers to Connect its Replicator Drone Swarms," Defense News, November 20, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/11/20/pentagon-picks-programmers-to-connect-its-replicator-drone-swarms/

[25] "The Pentagon's 'Replicator' Initiative: A Billion-Dollar 'Swarm' You Can't See," Pravda USA, October 29, 2025, https://usa.news-pravda.com/usa/2025/10/29/535222.html

[26] Kesteloo, "Pentagon's AI Drone Program"

[27] Brandi Vincent, "DOD Touts 'Successful Transition' for Replicator Initiative—But Questions Linger," DefenseScoop, September 3, 2025, https://defensescoop.com/2025/09/03/dod-replicator-drone-tech-transition-fielding-questions-linger/

[28] Caitlin Doornbos, "Navy on Track to Deploy Project Overmatch Capabilities with Carrier Strike Group in Early 2023," FedScoop, August 25, 2022, https://fedscoop.com/navy-on-track-to-deploy-project-overmatch-capabilities-with-carrier-strike-group-in-2023/

[29] Colin Demarest, "US Navy Wants $192 Million for Secretive Overmatch Networking Effort," C4ISRNET, March 13, 2023, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/c2-comms/2023/03/13/us-navy-wants-192-million-for-secretive-overmatch-networking-effort/

[30] "Navy BD Part 11: JADC2 and Project Overmatch," Giesler LLC, November 13, 2023, https://www.gieslerllc.com/post/navy-bd-part-11-jadc2-and-project-overmatch

[31] Megan Eckstein, "Project Overmatch: US Navy Preps to Deploy Secretive Multidomain Tech," Defense News, December 8, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2022/12/05/project-overmatch-us-navy-preps-to-deploy-secretive-multidomain-tech/

[32] "Autonomous Surface Vessel Maker Contracts with Navy for Drone Boats," Military Embedded Systems, November 27, 2025, https://militaryembedded.com/unmanned/payloads/autonomous-surface-vessel-maker-contracts-with-navy-for-drone-boats

[33] "Navy's New Unmanned Acquisition Office Set To Absorb 66 Programs Across All Domains," Defense Daily, November 19, 2025, https://www.defensedaily.com/navys-new-unmanned-acquisition-office-set-to-absorb-66-programs-across-all-domains/navy-usmc/

[34] "Unmanned Vehicle 'Hellscape' Will Play a Crucial Role in the Defense of Taiwan," American Security Project, July 31, 2025, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/unmanned-vehicle-hellscape-will-play-a-crucial-role-in-the-defense-of-taiwan/

[35] "Pentagon Picks Firms to Coordinate Replicator Drone Swarms Against China," The Defense Post, November 21, 2024, https://thedefensepost.com/2024/11/21/pentagon-replicator-drone-swarms/

[36] "US Plans to Flood Taiwan Strait with Drones in 2025," Interesting Engineering, January 30, 2025, https://interestingengineering.com/military/us-confirms-unleashing-hellscape-of-drones

[37] Jared Serbu, "Navy Plans to Deploy Project Overmatch Capabilities Throughout the Fleet 'Sooner Than Later,'" DefenseScoop, January 23, 2023, https://defensescoop.com/2022/10/21/navy-plans-to-deploy-project-overmatch-capabilities-throughout-the-fleet-sooner-than-later/

[38] Sam LaGrone and Megan Eckstein, "The U.S. Navy's Unmanned Future Remains Murky as China Threat Looms," USNI News, December 15, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/11/30/the-u-s-navys-unmanned-future-remains-murky-as-china-threat-looms

[39] Eckstein, "Project Overmatch: US Navy Preps to Deploy Secretive Multidomain Tech"

[40] Gabriel Honrada, "US Plans 'Hellscape' Drone Swarm in a Taiwan War," Asia Times, June 17, 2024, https://asiatimes.com/2024/06/us-plans-hellscape-drone-swarm-in-a-taiwan-war/