Trump's America First Arms Transfer Strategy:

Unmanned Systems and AI Trade Enter New Era

BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front): President Donald Trump's America First Arms Transfer Strategy, signed February 6, 2026, fundamentally restructures U.S. defense exports to prioritize domestic industrial expansion while accelerating sales of AI-enabled unmanned aerial systems. The executive order creates unprecedented opportunities for collaborative combat aircraft and autonomous drone manufacturers while establishing stricter controls on artificial intelligence technology transfers, reshaping the $300 billion annual U.S. arms export market.

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration's sweeping overhaul of America's arms transfer policy signals a strategic pivot that could dramatically accelerate international sales of autonomous unmanned systems while tightening controls on the underlying artificial intelligence technologies that enable them.

The America First Arms Transfer Strategy, formalized through executive order on Feb. 6, directs the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Commerce to develop within 120 days a prioritized sales catalog of weapons platforms the U.S. will actively promote to allies and partners. Industry sources indicate this catalog will prominently feature unmanned aerial systems (UAS), particularly collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) and AI-enabled platforms that represent the cutting edge of autonomous warfare technology.

"This strategy will advance a technologically superior, ready, and resilient national security industrial enterprise," the executive order states, emphasizing that foreign purchases will be leveraged to "build American production and capacity." The policy marks a fundamental departure from the previous "partner-first" approach that the administration contends led to production backlogs and years-long delivery delays.

UNMANNED SYSTEMS POSITIONED FOR EXPORT SURGE

The policy arrives as the U.S. unmanned systems industry stands at an inflection point. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) and Saudi Arabia are negotiating what could become the largest UAS transaction in history—up to 130 MQ-9B aircraft and 200 collaborative combat aircraft platforms valued in the tens of billions of dollars. GA-ASI President David Alexander confirmed at the Dubai Airshow in November 2025 that discussions include both the MQ-9B short takeoff and landing variant and the company's Gambit-series collaborative combat aircraft.

The executive order builds directly on Trump's June 2025 "Unleashing American Drone Dominance" directive, which instructed the Commerce Department to streamline export control regulations within 90 days to enable expedited export of U.S.-manufactured civil UAS. That order required all federal agencies to prioritize American-made drones over foreign alternatives and directed the Commerce Department to secure the domestic drone supply chain against foreign control.

"The breaks are off on arms sales. Everything is a go," a U.S. official told Middle East Eye in May 2025, describing the administration's approach to Gulf state defense transactions.

The Collaborative Combat Aircraft market alone is projected to reach $2.21 billion by 2033, with the U.S. segment expected to grow from $254 million in 2025 to $641 million by 2033 at a compound annual growth rate of 12.3%, according to market analysis from SNS Insider. The Air Force is planning up to 1,000 CCA platforms to operate alongside manned fighters, with the first operational capabilities expected by decade's end.

The Air Force awarded CCA prototype development contracts to Anduril Industries and GA-ASI in April 2024, advancing their YFQ-44A "Fury" and YFQ-42A platforms respectively. Both companies conducted initial flight tests in 2025, with production decisions expected in fiscal year 2026.

AMORTIZING DEVELOPMENT COSTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL SALES

The America First Arms Transfer Strategy's emphasis on leveraging foreign sales to build U.S. industrial capacity aligns with a business model General Atomics has pursued for over two decades with its unmanned systems.

GA-ASI has long cultivated international markets for its Predator, Reaper, and related platforms as a deliberate strategy to spread non-recurring engineering (NRE) development costs across a broader customer base, making advanced systems more affordable for both foreign operators and the U.S. military itself. The company has pursued this through a mix of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), with the latter offering higher potential profit margins despite greater regulatory complexity.

The multi-billion dollar development costs for advanced UAS platforms—encompassing airframe design, propulsion systems, sensor integration, ground control stations, and increasingly sophisticated autonomy software—create powerful economic incentives to expand the customer base beyond U.S. military procurement alone.

"International sales allow us to maintain production lines at economically efficient rates and invest in next-generation capabilities," a GA-ASI executive explained at a 2024 industry conference. "Without the international market, these systems would be significantly more expensive for U.S. forces."

This model has enabled GA-ASI to achieve economies of scale that reduce per-unit costs. The MQ-9 Reaper program, for example, has benefited from sales to the UK Royal Air Force, Italian Air Force, French Air Force, Spanish Air Force, and other allied nations. These international orders have helped sustain the production line and supplier base, reducing costs through higher volume manufacturing.

The approach extends to GA-ASI's emerging Collaborative Combat Aircraft development. The company's YFQ-42A prototype development represents massive upfront investment. International sales of operational CCA variants—whether through FMS or DCS channels—would help amortize these costs and potentially accelerate further development of Increment 2 and subsequent variants.

Current foreign interest in CCA-type platforms from Japan, Poland, Australia, and potentially Middle Eastern customers suggests substantial international market potential. The Air Force has explicitly noted it is "exploring international partnerships, including potential foreign military sales, under the CCA programme."

However, this business model has historically faced significant regulatory friction. GA-ASI's January 2025 letter to the Department of Government Efficiency specifically cited the "antiquated MTCR interpretation" that "ties the USG's hands even on straightforward export programs which enjoy bipartisan support."

The complaint reflects years of challenges where platforms like the MQ-9 Reaper faced export restrictions based on Missile Technology Control Regime provisions originally designed to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction delivery systems—despite UAS being fundamentally different from ballistic missiles in both purpose and technology.

The Trump administration partially addressed this in 2020 by reinterpreting MTCR to remove the "presumption of denial" for certain UAS exports, but industry sources indicated implementation remained slow and case-by-case approvals still created delays.

The America First Arms Transfer Strategy's directive to identify FMS and DCS opportunities within 120 days, develop a prioritized sales catalog, and streamline Enhanced End Use Monitoring could substantially reduce these barriers—potentially formalizing as government policy what has been GA-ASI's business strategy all along.

For Direct Commercial Sales specifically, the executive order's emphasis on "enhancing advocacy efforts encouraging foreign procurement of defense articles produced in America" suggests more active government support for contractor-led export campaigns. This could prove particularly valuable for GA-ASI, which has pursued DCS channels where regulatory complexity has been offset by higher profit margins and greater commercial flexibility.

The broader industry is watching closely. Northrop Grumman's RQ-4 Global Hawk has similarly benefited from international sales to NATO, Japan, and South Korea. Anduril Industries, though newer to the market, is positioning its Fury CCA platform for potential international customers alongside U.S. military procurement.

"The economics of modern defense development make international sales not just profitable but essential," noted a defense industry analyst. "You can't sustain these complex programs on U.S. orders alone, not if you want to keep unit costs manageable and maintain continuous innovation."

The strategy's emphasis on using arms transfers to "support domestic reindustrialization and improve the resiliency of our defense industrial base" essentially codifies this economic reality—acknowledging that foreign sales revenue funds the R&D, manufacturing capacity, and skilled workforce that ultimately serve U.S. military needs.

However, the model creates inherent tension with technology security concerns. The more widely a platform is exported, the greater the risk of technology compromise through reverse engineering, unauthorized transfers to third parties, or geopolitical shifts that transform allies into adversaries.

The executive order attempts to address this by requiring criteria for Enhanced End Use Monitoring within 90 days and establishing coordination between Defense, State, and Commerce departments on end-use monitoring activities. Whether these measures can adequately protect advanced AI and autonomy technologies while enabling the international sales volume that makes programs economically viable remains an open question as implementation details are developed.

THE FMS BURDEN: WHY DIRECT SALES OFFER APPEAL DESPITE COMPLEXITY

While Foreign Military Sales provide a structured framework backed by U.S. government-to-government agreements, the FMS process imposes substantial overhead costs and operational constraints that make Direct Commercial Sales attractive to manufacturers like GA-ASI despite DCS's own regulatory challenges.

Under FMS, the U.S. military serves as intermediary between the contractor and foreign customer, adding layers of administration, oversight, and cost. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages the process through military service program offices, each taking administrative fees and requiring compliance with military acquisition procedures.

"FMS adds 3.5 to 4 percent administrative surcharge, but the real cost is time and flexibility," explained a former defense contractor program manager with extensive FMS experience. "Every change order, every specification discussion, every delivery schedule adjustment goes through multiple military bureaucracies."

The operational security requirements for FMS programs create additional complexity, particularly when foreign representatives require access to U.S. manufacturing facilities or technical data. A former CACI engineer who worked on an FMS program for Taiwan's Combat Grande system as a subcontractor to Lockheed Martin recalled the challenges, where the Naval Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWAR, then known as SPAWAR) served as the U.S. government agent.

"We had foreign agents from Taiwan wandering around the plant," the engineer noted. "You're trying to execute a classified program while ensuring foreign nationals only see what they're authorized to see. It's a constant dance of access control and compartmentalization."

Export and technology transfer controls require elaborate security protocols. Engineers traveling to Taiwan for technical presentations could only use specially prepared "scrubbed" laptops and cell phones cleared of any unauthorized technical data. Information transfer occurred exclusively through encrypted, locked CDs, with detailed documentation of every data element provided.

"You couldn't just email a technical drawing or bring your work laptop," the engineer explained. "Everything had to go through formal technology transfer approval, data sanitization, and physical media under strict chain of custody."

These requirements extend throughout the program lifecycle. U.S. personnel working on FMS contracts require specific training and security awareness. Manufacturing facilities must maintain physical separation between areas where foreign nationals have access and those containing controlled technical data for other programs. Even routine engineering discussions require careful screening to ensure no inadvertent technology transfer occurs.

The administrative burden affects schedule and cost. Simple engineering changes that might take days to implement on a domestic program can require weeks or months of approval through FMS channels, as changes must be documented, justified to military program offices, potentially submitted for Congressional notification, and coordinated with foreign customer representatives through formal government-to-government channels.

"The FMS process was designed for major weapons systems with long acquisition timelines," noted a defense industry consultant specializing in international programs. "It's not optimized for the rapid iteration cycles that modern software-intensive systems require."

For contractors, these challenges make Direct Commercial Sales appealing despite DCS having its own regulatory complexity through State Department licensing, Commerce Department jurisdiction questions, and direct contractor responsibility for export compliance. DCS allows direct contractor-to-foreign-customer relationships, faster decision-making, and potentially higher profit margins since the contractor isn't sharing revenue with U.S. government intermediaries.

However, DCS transfers full export compliance liability to the contractor. Under FMS, the U.S. government manages end-use monitoring and third-party transfer controls. Under DCS, contractors must implement their own monitoring programs and bear legal responsibility if systems are diverted or misused.

The America First Arms Transfer Strategy's directive to "identify Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales opportunities" within 120 days and "streamline processes across executive departments and agencies" suggests the administration recognizes both channels have roles to play. The emphasis on reducing "delays and cumbersome bureaucracy" in Enhanced End Use Monitoring, Third-Party Transfer processes, and Congressional Notification directly addresses pain points contractors experience in both FMS and DCS channels.

The executive order's requirement to "enhance advocacy efforts encouraging foreign procurement of defense articles produced in America" could particularly benefit DCS by providing government support for contractor-led campaigns while maintaining commercial flexibility.

For advanced AI and autonomous systems, the choice between FMS and DCS channels carries additional weight. The rapid evolution of autonomy software and frequent updates needed for AI systems fit poorly with FMS's formal change control processes. Yet the technology security challenges—protecting proprietary algorithms, preventing reverse engineering, monitoring end-use—may require the government oversight and enforcement mechanisms that FMS provides.

"You want the commercial flexibility to update software rapidly, interface directly with customers, and maintain competitive pricing," explained a UAS business development executive. "But you also need assurance that your most advanced AI doesn't end up in unauthorized hands. There's no perfect answer."

For companies like GA-ASI that have pursued both channels based on specific customer and program requirements, the strategy's success will be measured not by which channel dominates, but whether both become efficient enough to support the international sales volume needed to amortize development costs and maintain U.S. competitiveness against foreign UAS manufacturers operating without comparable restrictions.

AI EXPORT CONTROLS CREATE TENSION

The arms transfer strategy's emphasis on expanding UAS sales exists in tension with increasingly complex artificial intelligence export controls that govern the enabling technologies for autonomous systems. The Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued its Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion in January 2025, establishing controls on advanced AI model weights and computing hardware.

The Trump administration rescinded the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule on May 13, 2025—two days before its compliance deadline—opting for what officials characterized as a more "targeted" approach. However, BIS simultaneously issued guidance in May 2025 warning that activities involving advanced semiconductors used for AI model training "has the potential to enable military-intelligence and weapons of mass destruction end uses" in countries of concern, including China.

Commerce Department guidance specifies that license requirements may apply when there is knowledge that AI models will support weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end uses. This creates a complex compliance landscape for UAS manufacturers integrating AI-powered autonomy into exportable platforms.

"The question for us is: Does this lead to policy approvals that allow us to go sell?" an industry source told Defense News regarding earlier drone export policy changes, expressing concern that bureaucratic obstacles could render policy shifts "toothless."

GA-ASI has been particularly vocal about export control reform. In a January 2025 letter to the Department of Government Efficiency, the company advocated for reforming U.S. interpretation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to focus on missile technology tied to weapons of mass destruction rather than UAS. "Today, the antiquated MTCR interpretation ties the USG's hands even on straightforward export programs which enjoy bipartisan support," GA-ASI stated.

STRATEGIC PRIORITIZATION AND BURDEN-SHARING

The executive order establishes clear criteria for prioritizing arms sales, favoring partners that have "invested in their own self-defense and capabilities, have a critical role or geography in United States plans and operations, or contribute to our economic security." This language appears designed to benefit Gulf states, Japan, and other allies with substantial defense budgets and strategic importance.

Japan and Poland have both expressed interest in acquiring loyal wingman platforms to complement their F-35 fleets. The U.S. Air Force is also exploring international partnerships under the CCA program, seeking what officials describe as "affordable mass at scale while enabling horizontal integration and interoperability between partners."

The Marine Corps selected Northrop Grumman and Kratos in January 2026 to develop operational CCA based on the XQ-58 Valkyrie platform, while the Navy and Army are developing service-specific autonomous teaming requirements. This multi-service adoption creates potential for foreign military sales across multiple platform variants.

TECHNOLOGY SECURITY CONCERNS PERSIST

Despite the administration's push to accelerate arms sales, defense and intelligence officials have raised concerns about technology security, particularly regarding Gulf states' economic relationships with China. The Biden administration never resolved differences with the United Arab Emirates over F-35 sales due to concerns about UAE ties to Beijing. A joint venture between UAE state-owned Edge and GA-ASI to integrate precision missiles into the MQ-9B SkyGuardian platform was authorized but remains incomplete, according to U.S. officials.

In December 2025, the Justice Department arrested two businessmen as part of Operation Gatekeeper, investigating alleged smuggling of advanced H200 AI chips to Chinese customers in violation of export controls. U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei described these chips as "the building blocks of AI superiority," noting that "the country that controls AI technology will control the future."

The tension between expanding arms sales and maintaining technology security extends to AI-enabled autonomous weapons systems. National security analysts have warned that open-source AI algorithms could enable adversaries to rapidly develop lethal autonomous capabilities. The discovery of AI-enhanced Shahed drones equipped with Nvidia Jetson processors in Ukraine demonstrates how commercial AI hardware can be weaponized.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION

The House Foreign Affairs Committee applauded the executive order, with Chairman Brian Mast stating it would "protect and extend our military's technological advantage for decades to come." The committee's bipartisan Foreign Military Sales Task Force, established in 2025, advanced several reform bills including the ARMOR Act and Made-in-America Defense Act, both signed into law.

The executive order establishes a Promoting American Military Sales Task Force to oversee strategy implementation and monitor major defense sales progress. Within 90 days, the Secretaries of Defense and State must develop clear criteria for determining which weapons require Enhanced End Use Monitoring—a critical issue for AI-enabled autonomous systems where technology transfer risks are significant.

The order also mandates quarterly publication of aggregate performance metrics on defense sales case execution, increasing transparency in a process historically criticized for delays. The administration claims the previous system resulted in production backlogs because "orders were mismatched to production capabilities."

INDUSTRY IMPACT AND GLOBAL COMPETITION

Beyond the major defense primes, the new strategy could benefit non-traditional defense companies that the executive order explicitly encourages to enter the defense industrial base. Anduril Industries, founded in 2017, has rapidly emerged as a CCA competitor alongside established players, demonstrating the potential for new entrants in autonomous systems.

The policy also responds to growing international competition in the unmanned systems market. China has emerged as a competitor in Middle Eastern drone sales, while multiple nations are developing indigenous loyal wingman platforms. China displayed several unmanned "loyal wingman" variants during military parades, including the FH-97 and FH-97A designed to operate with J-20 stealth fighters.

The UK delivered its first autonomous collaborative platform, StormShroud Mk1, into Royal Air Force service in May 2025, while Japan and the UK are collaborating under the Global Combat Air Programme to develop sixth-generation fighter capabilities alongside autonomous systems.

For the U.S. unmanned systems industry, the America First Arms Transfer Strategy represents both opportunity and challenge—accelerating export opportunities while navigating increasingly complex technology security requirements that will shape the global market for AI-enabled autonomous warfare systems.

The coming 120-day implementation period will prove critical in determining whether the administration can deliver on its promise to leverage over $300 billion in annual defense sales to "strategically reindustrialize the United States" while maintaining technological superiority over strategic competitors.

VERIFIED SOURCES

The White House. (2026, February 6). "Executive Order—Establishing an America First Arms Transfer Strategy." https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/establishing-an-america-first-arms-transfer-strategy/
The White House. (2026, February 6). "Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Establishes the America First Arms Transfer Strategy." https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-establishes-the-america-first-arms-transfer-strategy/
Roque, A. (2026, February 6). "New 'America First Arms Transfer Strategy' to create a list of priority weapons to sell." Breaking Defense. https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/new-america-first-arms-transfer-strategy-to-create-a-list-of-priority-weapons-to-sell/
House Foreign Affairs Committee. (2026, February 9). "Chairman Mast, Rep. Zinke Applaud President Trump's America First Arms Transfer Strategy." https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairman-mast-rep-zinke-applaud-president-trump-s-america-first-arms-transfer-strategy
The White House. (2025, June 6). "Executive Order—Unleashing American Drone Dominance." https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/unleashing-american-drone-dominance/
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. (2025, January 27). "Reforming Defense Acquisitions To Promote Global Security." https://www.ga-asi.com/reforming-defense-acquisitions-to-promote-global-security
Schmitz, R. (2025, November 20). "Trump Ally in Talks for Biggest-Ever US Military Drone Deal." Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/trump-ally-saudi-arabia-mq-9-us-military-drone-deal-11078745
SNS Insider. (2026, February 6). "Collaborative Combat Aircraft Market Projected to Reach USD 2.21 Billion by 2033." Globe Newswire. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/02/06/3233781/0/en/Collaborative-Combat-Aircraft-Market-Projected-to-Reach-USD-2-21-Billion-by-2033-Driven-by-Defense-Modernization-and-Autonomous-Technology-Integration-SNS-Insider.html
Defense.info. (2026, January). "An Update on Collaborative Combat Aircraft: January 2026." https://defense.info/defense-systems/an-update-on-collaborative-combat-aircraft-january-2026/
U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security. (2025, January 15). "Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion." Federal Register, Vol. 90, No. 9. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion
Mayer Brown LLP. (2025, May 16). "US Commerce Department Announces New Export Compliance Expectations Related to Artificial Intelligence." https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2025/05/us-commerce-department-announces-new-export-compliance-expectations-related-to-artificial-intelligence
Crowell & Moring LLP. (2025, May). "U.S. Department of Commerce Rescinds Biden Administration's AI Diffusion Export Control Rule." https://www.crowell.com/en/insights/client-alerts/us-department-of-commerce-rescinds-biden-administrations-ai-diffusion-export-control-rule-and-issues-new-guidance-on-huawei-chips-for-ai-purposes-and-diligence-expectations
Sabet, F. & Burnham, J. (2025, December 10). "Rolling Back Export Controls, U.S. Offers China Powerful AI Chips." Foundation for Defense of Democracies. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/12/10/rolling-back-export-controls-u-s-offers-china-powerful-ai-chips/
Kumar, P. & Wasser, B. (2025, May 13). "From AI to weapons, Trump's Gulf visit looks to swap politics for business." Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ai-weapons-trumps-gulf-visit-looks-swap-politics-business
White & Case LLP. (2025, June). "President Trump issues Executive Orders to promote the development of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Supersonic Flight." https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/president-trump-issues-executive-orders-promote-development-unmanned-aircraft-systems
Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2025, April 2). "Understanding U.S. Allies' Current Legal Authority to Implement AI and Semiconductor Export Controls." https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-us-allies-current-legal-authority-implement-ai-and-semiconductor-export
Airforce Technology. (2026, January). "Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), US." https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/collaborative-combat-aircraft-cca-usa/
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. "U.S. Air Force Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA)." https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12740
Shephard Media. "Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) (Increment 1) [USAF]." https://plus.shephardmedia.com/programmes/detail/collaborative-combat-aircraft-cca-usa/
American Action Forum. (2024, November 5). "AI Export Controls: Balancing National Security and AI Innovation." https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/ai-export-controls-balancing-national-security-and-ai-innovation/

SIDEBAR: Technology Security in the Age of Autonomous Exports

From Radar Software Protection to AI: Escalating Complexity in Export Controls

BLUF: As the U.S. accelerates exports of AI-enabled unmanned systems under the America First Arms Transfer Strategy, manufacturers face challenges that dwarf the already-difficult problem of protecting proprietary software in previous-generation systems like synthetic aperture radar—where encryption and self-destruct mechanisms guarded the algorithms that were the true source of system capability. The inherent vulnerability of UAVs to loss in hostile territory, combined with adversary success in reverse engineering captured systems and procuring restricted components through unauthorized channels, fundamentally limits the effectiveness of any technology protection measures.

WASHINGTON—Defense contractors' experience protecting software-based capabilities in exported radar systems offers both lessons and warnings for the far more complex challenge of securing AI-enabled autonomous systems, where the volume, adaptability, and distributed nature of critical code creates unprecedented vulnerabilities—compounded by the operational reality that unmanned systems frequently crash or are brought down in hostile territory, giving adversaries direct access to technology protection measures that were designed to prevent exactly that scenario.

THE RADAR PRECEDENT: SOFTWARE AS THE CROWN JEWEL

In advanced radar systems like General Atomics' Lynx synthetic aperture radar and ground moving target indicator (GMTI), the hardware—antennas, transmitters, receivers—represented mature technology. The revolutionary capability resided in proprietary signal processing algorithms: how to extract targets from clutter, achieve ultra-high resolution imaging, detect slow-moving vehicles, and perform coherent change detection.

"The software was everything," explained a former SAR systems engineer with export program experience. "That's where decades of R&D investment lived—in the algorithms."

Protecting this software in export systems required multi-layered approaches including encryption and self-destruct mechanisms designed to prevent reverse engineering if systems were captured, sold to third parties, or subjected to unauthorized access attempts. The specific methods remain closely held, but the fundamental challenge was clear: prevent adversaries from extracting and replicating the signal processing techniques that provided operational advantage.

These protections had to balance security with operational reliability—systems that destroyed their own software at the first anomaly would be useless to legitimate operators. The protections also had to survive in harsh operational environments: extreme temperatures, vibration, electromagnetic interference, and the chaos of combat operations.

THE OPERATIONAL REALITY: UAV LOSS IS INEVITABLE

Security of UAV systems has always been complicated by a fundamental operational reality: unmanned aircraft frequently crash or are brought down in hostile territory, providing adversaries with direct physical access to the very technology protection measures designed to prevent compromise.

Iran famously captured a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone largely intact in December 2011, subsequently reverse-engineering aspects of its design and producing indigenous variants. Iranian officials displayed the captured aircraft on state television and later unveiled domestically produced copies incorporating design elements from the American platform.

Russia, Iran, and China are all known to have reverse-engineered Western UAV technology from captured or crashed systems. Ukrainian forces have systematically analyzed Russian drones brought down during the current conflict, identifying components, understanding control systems, and developing targeted countermeasures. This analysis has enabled Ukraine to develop electronic warfare techniques specifically tailored to disrupt Russian UAV operations.

The reverse engineering works both ways. Russia has similarly analyzed captured Western-supplied UAV systems, including commercial quadcopters and military reconnaissance platforms, using insights gained to improve its own systems and develop countermeasures.

"Every time a UAV goes down over contested territory, you have to assume the adversary will recover it and tear it apart," noted a former intelligence analyst specializing in UAV technology. "Your technology protection timeline starts the moment the aircraft crashes."

THE PROCUREMENT CHALLENGE: UNAUTHORIZED SUPPLY CHAINS

Even more concerning than battlefield losses is the success adversaries have achieved in procuring Western components through unauthorized channels despite export controls. The December 2025 Justice Department arrests in Operation Gatekeeper—investigating alleged smuggling of advanced H200 AI chips to Chinese customers—represent just one example of systematic efforts to circumvent U.S. export restrictions.

Commercial components found in Russian and Iranian UAVs operating in Ukraine have included Western-manufactured microprocessors, GPS receivers, optical sensors, and communication modules—many subject to export controls but obtained through third-country intermediaries, shell companies, or falsified end-user certificates.

A 2024 analysis of Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munitions by Conflict Armament Research identified at least 40 Western-manufactured components, including U.S.-made microcontrollers and accelerometers, acquired despite export restrictions. The supply chains often ran through multiple countries, obscuring the ultimate end-user.

The AI-enhanced Shahed drone shot down by Ukrainian forces in late 2025 contained an Nvidia Jetson processor—a commercially available AI computing platform—along with thermal imaging and visible-spectrum cameras. While these components aren't inherently weapons, their integration into autonomous targeting systems demonstrates how commercial AI hardware can be weaponized despite export controls.

"You can control direct sales, but determined adversaries will find ways to acquire components," explained a Commerce Department export control official speaking on background. "Shell companies, transshipment, false documentation—the methods are well established."

This reality fundamentally undermines assumptions about protecting critical technology through export controls alone. If adversaries can acquire the same AI accelerators, sensors, and processors used in U.S. systems through unauthorized channels, export restrictions on complete platforms may delay but not prevent capability development.

AI SYSTEMS: COMPOUNDING THE VULNERABILITY

The challenge of protecting AI-enabled autonomous systems makes radar software protection look comparatively straightforward, according to current defense AI researchers and export control specialists—and the inherent vulnerability of UAVs to loss or component procurement makes the problem even more intractable.

Scale and Distribution

Where radar signal processing might involve megabytes of tightly coupled code running on dedicated hardware, AI systems for autonomous platforms can involve:

Multiple large neural network models (potentially gigabytes each)
Training datasets and fine-tuning data
Sensor fusion algorithms integrating multiple data streams
Mission planning and collaborative teaming software
Real-time decision-making frameworks
Updates and patches delivered over system lifetime

"You're not protecting one piece of software anymore," noted a defense AI researcher. "You're protecting an entire ecosystem that evolves over time—and all of it could potentially be recovered from a crashed aircraft."

The Update Problem

AI systems require continuous updates as models are refined, bugs are fixed, and capabilities are enhanced. Each update represents a potential vulnerability—a new opportunity for interception, man-in-the-middle attacks, or unauthorized copying.

Traditional systems could be delivered with software locked down for their operational lifetime. Modern AI systems require authenticated update mechanisms, secure communication channels, and version control—all of which create additional attack surfaces and additional opportunities for compromise if systems are captured.

The Training Data Question

Unlike traditional algorithms where the code itself contains the capability, AI models derive their capability from training data. Even if the model architecture is protected, an adversary with sufficient computational resources and similar training data could potentially recreate comparable capabilities.

"The genie is already partly out of the bottle," observed a machine learning researcher specializing in computer vision. "Once someone knows that a particular approach works—say, using synthetic aperture radar imagery to train target recognition—they can pursue parallel development even without your exact model."

Ukrainian analysis of downed Russian drones has revealed this dynamic in practice. By understanding what sensors are integrated, what mission profiles are executed, and what performance characteristics are achieved, Ukrainian forces have developed both countermeasures and informed their own UAV development programs—all without necessarily accessing the source code or training data.

Distributed Intelligence and Edge Computing

Collaborative combat aircraft and unmanned teaming systems distribute intelligence across multiple platforms. Protecting software becomes exponentially harder when:

Multiple aircraft carry copies of critical algorithms
Platforms share mission data and coordinate autonomously
Communication between platforms could be intercepted
Loss of any single platform potentially compromises the entire system's approach
Each additional exported platform multiplies the attack surface

Hardware-Software Integration Challenges

Modern AI systems increasingly use specialized hardware accelerators—GPUs, tensor processing units, or custom AI chips. Effective software protection must account for:

Side-channel attacks that observe power consumption or electromagnetic emissions to infer algorithm behavior
Firmware vulnerabilities in commercial AI accelerator chips
The challenge of securing software when it runs on hardware not designed with military-grade security
The reality that the same commercial AI chips found in exported systems can be procured through unauthorized channels

The discovery of Nvidia Jetson processors in Iranian drones demonstrates this challenge. Even if proprietary AI models are protected, adversaries can acquire the same commercial computing hardware and develop their own models for similar missions.

Adversarial AI and Adaptive Threats

Perhaps most concerning: AI systems can potentially be attacked by other AI systems. Adversarial machine learning techniques can probe exported systems to:

Identify decision boundaries and reverse-engineer model behavior
Discover vulnerabilities in object recognition or threat assessment
Develop countermeasures specifically tailored to the exported system's weaknesses

"You're not just protecting against reverse engineering," explained a DARPA program manager working on robust AI. "You're protecting against active, intelligent probing by adversarial algorithms designed specifically to map your system's decision-making."

Ukrainian forces have demonstrated this capability, using machine learning to analyze patterns in Russian drone operations and develop optimized jamming strategies. The approach doesn't require access to Russian source code—behavioral analysis of operational systems suffices.

THE OPEN SOURCE COMPLICATION

Many current autonomous systems build on open-source frameworks: TensorFlow, PyTorch, Robot Operating System (ROS). While the specific models and training approaches remain proprietary, the foundational architecture is public knowledge.

This differs fundamentally from the radar era, where signal processing approaches were themselves closely guarded. An adversary examining a captured AI-enabled UAV already knows the basic framework—the question is whether they can extract the specific models, hyperparameters, and training approaches that deliver superior performance.

And increasingly, the answer is that they don't need to extract them—they can develop their own using the same open-source tools, informed by observing what capabilities are achievable.

CURRENT APPROACHES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS IN OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

Defense contractors and government agencies are exploring multiple protection strategies, but each faces fundamental limitations when confronted with the operational reality of UAV loss:

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs): Hardware-isolated secure enclaves where critical AI inference occurs, theoretically preventing external access. However, recent academic research has demonstrated vulnerabilities in commercial TEE implementations through side-channel attacks and fault injection. More fundamentally, if a UAV crashes intact or is shot down and recovered, adversaries have unlimited time to attack hardware security measures in laboratory conditions.

Self-Destruct Mechanisms: Automated systems to destroy critical components or data upon unauthorized access, capture, or crash detection. These face the challenge of distinguishing actual compromise from benign system failures or recoverable crashes. Too sensitive, and you destroy expensive aircraft unnecessarily; too conservative, and you fail to prevent technology transfer. The RQ-170 capture suggests these mechanisms either failed or were insufficient against sophisticated electronic warfare techniques.

Homomorphic Encryption: Performing computation on encrypted data without decrypting it. Promising but currently imposes severe computational overhead—potentially incompatible with real-time autonomous operations requiring split-second decisions. Moreover, the encryption keys must reside somewhere on the platform, creating a single point of failure if the aircraft is captured.

Model Obfuscation: Deliberately complicating neural network architectures to make reverse engineering harder. Effectiveness remains uncertain, and obfuscation can degrade performance or reliability. More critically, obfuscation does nothing to prevent behavioral analysis—adversaries can still observe what the system does and develop their own implementations.

Behavioral Monitoring and Authentication: Systems that continuously verify they're operating within approved parameters and can detect anomalous access attempts. More feasible than in the radar era due to increased computational resources, but defining "normal" for adaptive AI systems in unpredictable combat environments remains difficult. These mechanisms are also vulnerable to electronic warfare techniques that spoof authentication or prevent communication with validation servers.

Cloud-Dependent Architectures: Critical AI operations performed on remote servers rather than onboard the aircraft. This maintains control over algorithms but creates vulnerability to jamming, satellite denial, or communication intercept. Iranian forces reportedly used electronic warfare to capture the RQ-170 by disrupting its satellite links—cloud-dependent architectures would face similar vulnerabilities.

THE DEGRADATION STRATEGY: ACCEPTING INEVITABLE COMPROMISE

Given the operational reality of UAV loss and component procurement through unauthorized channels, some defense strategists advocate for a fundamentally different approach: accept that exported technology will eventually be compromised and focus on the timeline rather than prevention.

This "degradation strategy" involves:

Generational Lag: Export only systems one or two generations behind current U.S. capabilities, ensuring that even if compromised, the technology gap remains substantial.

Continuous Innovation: Maintain such rapid development cycles that by the time adversaries reverse-engineer exported systems, next-generation capabilities have already been fielded.

Capability Limitation: Build export variants with genuine performance limitations—not just software locks that can be bypassed, but fundamental architectural differences that cannot be easily upgraded.

Forensic Tracking: Embed unique identifiers in components and software that allow tracking of how technology proliferates, informing intelligence assessments and future export decisions.

"You plan for the aircraft to crash over hostile territory," explained a former Air Force acquisition official. "The question is: what's the technology timeline? If it takes them two years to exploit what they recover, and we've moved two generations ahead in that time, the compromise is manageable."

THE COMPONENT PROLIFERATION PROBLEM

The unauthorized procurement of Western components represents perhaps the most intractable challenge. Unlike complete platforms, individual components—microprocessors, sensors, communication modules—are difficult to track through global supply chains.

The use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components in military systems amplifies this challenge. The same AI accelerators, GPS receivers, and cameras that enable advanced autonomous capabilities are available commercially for civilian applications. Restricting their export would cripple legitimate commercial trade while determined adversaries would still find ways to acquire them.

"We found Western components in every Russian drone we examined," noted a Ukrainian defense official in a 2025 interview. "Some were recent production, acquired through intermediaries. Export controls slow them down but don't stop them."

This reality suggests that protecting AI-enabled autonomous systems may be less about preventing adversary access to enabling components and more about maintaining advantage in system integration, training data quality, operational concepts, and innovation tempo.

THE FUNDAMENTAL ASYMMETRY

A senior cryptographer with national security clearance summarized the core challenge: "With traditional software protection, you're defending against someone trying to extract and copy code. With AI in operational UAVs, you're defending against someone who can recover your crashed aircraft, observe your operational systems thousands of times, and acquire your components through unauthorized channels. The threat model is fundamentally different—and fundamentally more difficult."

This behavioral replication threat, combined with inevitable platform loss and component proliferation, means that even perfect software protection may be insufficient. Once an adversary understands what capabilities are possible—that autonomous target recognition works at certain accuracy levels, that collaborative teaming enables specific tactical advantages—they can pursue independent development informed by analyzing crashed systems, procuring similar components, and observing operational performance.

OPERATIONAL REALITY: CALCULATED RISK

Former Pentagon acquisition officials acknowledge that perfect protection remains impossible in operational conditions. "The question isn't whether exported systems could eventually be compromised," said a former defense acquisition executive. "The question is: how long does it take, how much does it cost the adversary, how many systems do we lose before they get a pristine example, and how fast are we innovating to stay ahead?"

The intelligence community reportedly assumes that any exported system will eventually be thoroughly analyzed by sophisticated adversaries—either through battlefield recovery, unauthorized component procurement, or operational observation. Export decisions therefore focus on:

Time delay before compromise (measured in years)
Adversary resources required (nation-state capabilities vs. non-state actors)
Technology degradation timeline (how quickly the capability becomes obsolete)
Strategic value of the partnership vs. technology transfer risk
Expected loss rate in operational conditions

THE POLICY VACUUM PERSISTS

Despite these challenges, current export control regulations remain largely unchanged from the hardware-centric era. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR) provide limited specific guidance on protecting AI systems, training data, or behavioral capabilities—and even less guidance on managing the reality of inevitable platform loss and component proliferation.

The America First Arms Transfer Strategy's call to streamline Enhanced End Use Monitoring and develop clear criteria for technology protection within 90 days may force these issues to the forefront. However, industry sources express skepticism that comprehensive solutions can be developed on such tight timelines, particularly for challenges that have vexed the defense establishment for decades.

The requirement to monitor end-use becomes particularly complex when platforms are expected to crash, be captured, or transfer technology through reverse engineering rather than deliberate diversion. Traditional end-use monitoring focuses on ensuring systems aren't sold to unauthorized parties—but what's the framework when the transfer occurs through battlefield loss rather than sale?

INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE: COMPETITIVE PRESSURE

Defense contractors face pressure from multiple directions. Excessive protection measures make systems less reliable or more expensive, reducing competitiveness against Chinese, Turkish, and Israeli alternatives that offer increasingly capable autonomous systems with fewer restrictions—and which themselves may incorporate reverse-engineered Western technology or components acquired through unauthorized channels.

"Every authentication handshake, every encrypted communication requirement, every hardware security module adds cost, weight, power consumption, and potential failure modes," noted an aerospace systems engineer. "Customers notice. And if our systems are less reliable because of security measures, they'll buy from competitors who may already have our technology through other means."

Yet inadequate protection risks both technology compromise and potential legal liability under export control laws. Companies must navigate between operational competitiveness and regulatory compliance while managing genuinely unprecedented technical challenges—knowing that even their best efforts may be undermined by battlefield losses or unauthorized component procurement.

LESSONS FROM THE RADAR ERA

What does translate from protecting radar software to protecting AI systems?

Defense in depth remains essential: No single protection measure suffices. Layered approaches—combining encryption, authentication, hardware security, behavioral monitoring, and continuous innovation—raise the bar even if perfect security remains impossible.

Operational reliability cannot be sacrificed: Protection mechanisms that render systems unreliable in legitimate operational use will be disabled, bypassed, or rejected by foreign operators. Security must be transparent to authorized users.

The human element matters: Many compromises occur through insider threats, maintenance procedures, or operational security failures rather than sophisticated technical attacks. Training, access controls, and operational procedures remain critical.

Innovation tempo is protective: The most effective long-term defense may be maintaining such rapid innovation that by the time adversaries reverse-engineer exported or captured systems, the technology has been superseded by next-generation capabilities.

Accept imperfect protection: Unlike radar systems that might avoid hostile territory, UAVs operate where loss is an accepted operational risk. Protection strategies must account for inevitable compromise rather than assuming prevention is possible.

What doesn't translate: the nature of AI systems—their scale, adaptability, behavioral complexity, and dependence on data rather than just code—combined with the operational reality that UAVs crash in hostile territory and components proliferate through unauthorized channels, means that techniques sufficient for protecting radar signal processing software may prove fundamentally inadequate for the autonomous systems era.

As one former NSA cryptographer put it: "We knew how to protect the software when the software was the weapon and the platform stayed in friendly airspace. Now the software learns, adapts, evolves, and operates in contested territory where we expect to lose platforms. And the adversary can buy many of the same components we use. We're still figuring out what protection even means in that context."

THE STRATEGIC CALCULATION

The defense establishment's approach may ultimately be less about perfecting technology protection than about:

Accepting calculated risk in exchange for strategic benefits of arming allies
Maintaining continuous innovation to stay ahead of proliferation timelines
Building partnerships where the strategic value outweighs technology transfer risk
Recognizing that today's advanced capability becomes tomorrow's baseline technology accessible to all sophisticated actors through multiple pathways
Understanding that preventing component proliferation may be impossible in global commercial markets

As the Trump administration moves to accelerate exports of AI-enabled autonomous systems under the America First Arms Transfer Strategy, this risk calculation becomes increasingly urgent. The strategy explicitly aims to leverage over $300 billion in annual defense sales to expand U.S. production capacity and maintain technological superiority—but the operational history of UAV loss, reverse engineering, and unauthorized component procurement suggests that exported superiority may be temporary at best.

The question facing policymakers and industry is not whether exported autonomous systems will eventually be compromised—the operational reality suggests they will, either through battlefield loss, component proliferation, or behavioral observation. The question is whether the strategic benefits of exports, industrial base expansion, and allied capability development justify accepting that compromises will occur, and whether the U.S. can maintain innovation tempo sufficient to stay ahead of the proliferation timeline.

For companies like GA-ASI that have built business models on international sales to amortize development costs, this reality may argue for even more aggressive export strategies—if technology will eventually proliferate anyway, better to profit from controlled sales to allies while maintaining market share and funding next-generation development, rather than restricting sales only to see the technology compromised through other pathways while competitors capture international markets.

The alternative—attempting to maintain perfect security through export restrictions—may be both technically impossible and strategically counterproductive, ceding international markets to competitors while failing to prevent the very technology transfer that restrictions were designed to stop.

The coming 120-day implementation period will reveal whether the America First Arms Transfer Strategy acknowledges these operational realities or continues to assume that technology protection measures can prevent what decades of UAV operations suggest is inevitable: that autonomous systems operating in contested environments will be lost, analyzed, and reverse-engineered regardless of protection mechanisms, and that the components enabling those systems will proliferate through channels that export controls cannot fully prevent.

Sources:

National Interest. (2025, September 17). "Trump's AI Action Plan Doesn't Go Far Enough on National Security." https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland/trumps-ai-action-plan-doesnt-go-far-enough-on-national-security
Just Security. (2025, December 12). "AI Model Outputs Demand the Attention of Export Control Agencies." https://www.justsecurity.org/126643/ai-model-outputs-export-control/
Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2023, July 5). "For Export Controls on AI, Don't Forget the 'Catch-All' Basics." https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/dont-forget-the-catch-all-basics-ai-export-controls/
Foundation for Defense of Democracies. (2025, December 10). "Rolling Back Export Controls, U.S. Offers China Powerful AI Chips." https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/12/10/rolling-back-export-controls-u-s-offers-china-powerful-ai-chips/
U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security. (2025, January 15). "Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion." Federal Register, Vol. 90, No. 9. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion

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